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 This study presents a review of digital technologies and their globalizing effects 
regarding Tibetans living in diaspora. Specifically, this research involves Tibetan-Americans 
living in the mid-western United States and their responses to the use of digital technology in 
diasporic cultural maintenance and transnational hegemony. Two topics of interest are primarily 
dealt with herein. First, the issue of digital technology and its use in global surveillance and 
political suppression, specifically regarding conflicts between Chinese state apparatuses and 
diasporic Tibetan activist groups. Second, this thesis shows the various ways Tibetans in 
diaspora use digital technology to negotiate, maintain, and participate in their cultural 
community. In this way, the thesis demonstrates both the freeing and constricting effects digital 
technologies bring to social groups in the digital age. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 In March of 2018, I read an article in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Marriott Employee 
Roy Jones Hit ‘Like.’ Then China Got Mad.” I was intrigued because of my interest in digital 
anthropology and the geographic region of central Asia. I was curious to find how an American 
hotel employee could draw the ire of an entire nation-state through a seemingly isolated act on 
social media. Though, as this thesis will show, no act on social media is truly isolated. Doubly 
interesting to me was that Mr. Jones’ sin dealt with the issue of Tibet, a political sore spot for the 
Chinse Communist Party and an issue I had studied previously.  
 Ma (2018a) explained that Roy Jones, a social media consultant for Marriot, had recently 
shared a survey with the company’s Twitter audience. In order to ascertain the most profitable 
place to build new hotels, the survey asked users to list which countries they would be most 
interested in traveling. This survey listed both Taiwan and Tibet as separate countries, an idea 
that the Chinese government disdains and actively acts against. That in and of itself might not 
have been so problematic, but matters were complicated when a Tibetan activist group (one that 
advocates for the sovereignty of Tibetans within China), called “Friends of Tibet”, congratulated 
Marriot for this distinction (Figure 1.1). Roy Jones, who works nights for the chain and stated 
that he ‘likes’ upwards of 300 tweets per shift, ‘liked’ this aforementioned tweet, tacitly 
endorsing the notion of Tibetan sovereignty (as China views such activist groups as separatists) 
(Ma 2018a).  
 Very likely, Jones was simply going through the motions of his daily digital routine, but 
the consequences of his actions were tangible. In the days following, Marriot would be 
bombarded by hundreds of angry Chinese-aligned Twitter users as well as drawing the 
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Figure 1.1 
 
condemnation of Chinese government officials. Marriot publicly apologized, stating that the 
original survey that listed Tibet as a separate country was an accident, and terminated the 
employment of Roy Jones. Chinese authorities were seemingly appeased, but Marco Rubio, an 
American Senator from Florida, responded negatively to Jones’ firing on his own Twitter 
account, claiming that this was “the long arm of China” (Figure 1.2).  
 Elsewhere, I have summarized the importance of this event as showing how the simple 
act of engaging with a ‘tweet’ on a digital media platform becomes the flashpoint of a complex 
geopolitical process that lost a man his job; lost the company doing business in China revenue; 
and elicited a response from a US government official on the same platform (Keck 2018).  
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Figure 1.2 
 
This event exemplifies many of the questions I wish to explore in this thesis. First, how is 
transnational state hegemony affected by digital technology? In this case, an American social 
media coordinator working for $14 an hour was fired due to pressure from a foreign nation-state. 
This would be unheard of without social media and other connecting digital technologies which 
increase both the scope and scale of globalization. This will increasingly become our reality and 
begs the question of whether any of us have the luxury of escaping transnational hegemony and 
geopolitics in the digital age.  
 Second, since this subject primarily affects Tibetans and Tibetan refugees, what are their 
responses to these processes? This second question forms a large part of my research which 
seeks to understand how marginalized populations use technology to their advantage when 
confronted with transnational governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), hegemony, and 
globalized politics. In addition, I address how such technologies fundamentally change the 
4 
 
culture of communities in diaspora. This topic touches on subjects such as contested history and 
ethnolinquistics, which I examine in Chapter 3.  Paramount among my interests in this subject is 
the concept of agency within marginalized communities and to what extent digital technologies 
allow such agency to flourish. However, as I have noted above, these technologies also allow for 
constraints and oppression of the same communities.  
 Finally, this research is intended to be applicable to a broad range of areas of 
anthropological interest such as diaspora, refugees, and political economy studies. I am a digital 
anthropologist and, as such, my focus is on human actors and the ways in which they use 
technology. That theme, more than any other, runs through the length of this text. 
Literature Review 
History and Historiography 
 While this study is not specifically historical in nature, the deeply contested history of 
Tibet and its sovereignty as a nation is important in understanding the maintenance of Tibetan 
diaspora online or off. Since 1959, after a failed Tibetan uprising against the occupying People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), after which the Dalai Lama fled Tibet into exile, the legitimacy of 
Tibetan or Chinese sovereignty over the Tibetan plateau has been a crucial debate for both 
camps. I will examine these events a bit more thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
 Among Tibetans in diaspora, history is social as well as political, forming the 
underpinning of a shared historical memory and community (Shakya 1999; Smith Jr. 1997; 
McGranahan 2005, 2010). In his examination of the historiography of the subject, John Powers 
(2004) notes that history is a tool of political control used by both sides in an attempt to exert 
their own perspectives. He notes that it is “history as propaganda” and evidences, as other 
scholars have, how a shared historical memory (even a flawed one) matters deeply to, not just 
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refugees, but all cultures and nationalities (McGranahan 2005, 2010; Smith Jr. 1997, 2008, 2010; 
van Shaik 2011).  
 Several scholars have attempted to write objective histories of the contentious subject of 
Tibetan independence, each receiving their fair share of criticism from one side or the other. 
Some argue squarely that, previous to the 1951 occupation of Tibet by the People’s Liberation 
Army of China, Tibet was an independent territory (Norbu 1987; Shakya 1999; Smith Jr. 1997). 
Others argue that the subject is more complex, with de jure claims to the territory on both sides, 
but generally agreeing that Tibet was a part of Qing Dynasty China (Goldstein 1997; Powers 
2004). Chinese sources generally point to either the Manchu Dynasty or the marriage of the 
Chinese Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan Emperor Songsten Gampo in 641 CE as points in 
which Tibet was absorbed into China. Tibetans dismiss these outright, arguing that the Manchu 
dynasty was actually a Mongol occupation of China, meaning they were no more under Chinese 
rule than the Han (Norbu 1987). The princess argument is generally dismissed due to the series 
of events which led to the marriage. In short, the Tibetan Empire defeated the Chinese Empire of 
the time and the marriage was agreed to for diplomacy’s sake (Beckwith 1987).  
 Regardless, each side has its perspective and sticks to it. Indeed, at this point, focusing on 
specific historical detail seems to miss the point. All knowledge is couched in subjectivity 
(Haraway 1988), but, according to Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob (1994) “because history and 
historical evidence are so crucial to people’s sense of identity, the evidence itself often becomes 
the focus of struggle” (5). Therefore, this debate is important because it continues to be central to 
Tibetan identity and cultural memory (Bal, Crewe, and Spitzer 1999). This is especially the case 
when one sees the patterns of debate and historical memory played out consistently online.  
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 Reliably, when online forums such as Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube contain references 
to Tibet, even without explicit reference to political subjects, it will ignite passionate responses 
from both pro-Tibetan and Chinese users. For example, Figure 1.3 shows a screenshot from a 
National Geographic video describing the history of the Potala Palace in Lhasa, Tibet (the past 
home of the Dalai Lamas and now a museum). Despite the video not mentioning any of the 
complex and controversial history of the territory and going as far as to stress that the palace is 
within China’s borders, the comments section boasts an aggressive debate between users on 
Tibetan history and sovereignty.  
 
Figure 1.3 
7 
 
It should be noted that I do not generalize all Tibetan or Chinese viewpoints. There are myriad 
differences in the viewpoints of each group; rather, I am pointing to two general patterns in the 
debate surrounding the “Tibet question” (Goldstein 1997). 
 Issues of history and political sovereignty will be referenced where necessary in this text, 
but this does not make up the bulk of my analysis. As stated, this is not a history; however, 
Tibetans and the debates around Tibetan activism are, perhaps more than other groups, deeply 
connected to the recent past and therefore their stories and their lives deal with history.   
Transnationalism and Diaspora 
A distinction should be made between ‘international’ politics and processes that are 
‘transnational’. Vertovec (2009) argued that “inter-national” is a term suited for the “to-ing and 
fro-ing” between nation-states, such as goods and travel, but “trans-national” should be reserved 
for those processes occurring between actors and institutions across borders. This distinction is 
important to this research as it clarifies the essence of transnationality being the linkages and 
spaces in between states and across borders. The case of Roy Jones and Marriott Hotels is not 
one of international policy between states, but rather the leaking of complex geopolitical and 
historical processes into and between non-state actors.  
 As early as 1969, scholars began to question the definition of an ethnic group. Frederick 
Barth (1969) critiqued contemporary analyses of the culture concept and ethnic groups by 
arguing that they are distinguished by boundaries set and maintained by their members, rather 
than by borders or geography. Indeed, beginning with scholars such as Nina Glick-Schiller 
(Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1994) and Ulf Hannerz (1996), the idea of nation as a 
bounded entity became too restricting for the social sciences. Rather, scholars moved past this 
notion of methodological nationalism and into the idea of deterritorialization in the globalized 
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world (Appadurai 1996; Wimmer and Schiller 2002). In the deterritorialized/globalized world, 
the concept of the nation-state no longer served as the defining characteristic of cultures, trade, 
or ideas. Appadurai (1996) examines this unboundedness through his “-scapes” concept. This 
framework fits nicely into this research, as I am concerned with the global connections of the 
Tibetan diaspora, especially in the form of “technoscapes” which, in this case, is doubly complex 
in the form of WeChat, a Chinese made mobile app used by Tibetans to foster connections in 
diaspora as well as with those within Tibet.  
 Diaspora is a related, but necessarily different concept than transnationalism, though 
some scholars (intentionally or not) tend to use the term synonymously. A transnational 
corporation like Google is not diasporic, for example. Traditionally, diaspora is conceptualized 
by the dispersal of ethnic communities outside of common geographic place of origin. However, 
scholars such as Brian Axel (2002, 2004) argue that this analytic model for diaspora studies is 
limited and ineffective. Instead, he argues diasporic communities tend to be united more so by 
forms of “violence” in their shared history, thus forming the “diasporic imaginary” (Axel 2002). 
This is an important distinction and changes how one studies diaspora in general. Cross 
referencing it with other diaspora scholars proves its effectiveness. For example, Victoria Bernal 
(2017) echoes the importance of a shared memory of violence or harm in her work with the 
Eritrean diaspora. These studies do not discount the importance of a shared geographic homeland 
to those in diaspora, but merely suggest that it is not the most prominent concept in which such 
examples form shared communities.  
 The Tibetan diaspora exemplifies this. While the geographic homeland of Tibet is 
important to Tibetans in diaspora, the events of the 1950s and subsequent continuing human 
rights abuses and violence (here being both physical and structural) is what truly rallies the 
9 
 
community. This is especially true for individuals further removed from Tibet proper, such as 
those born and raised outside of Tibet.  
 Finally, Nina Glick-Schiller (2005) offered a critique of previous transnational studies 
that I wish to adhere to. First, not all diaspora groups or transnational citizens are monolithic 
groups and “even long-distance nationalists who identify with a nation-state building project in 
an ancestral homeland usually live within a social field that includes multiple social networks 
that are not ethnically based,” (442-443). One could argue that this is an obvious critique, but it 
relates more to the misguided use of the diaspora as the only unit of analysis. Second, and 
perhaps most importantly for this study, she states that “There is a tendency in Transnational 
Studies to treat all nation-states as if they were equal and sovereign actors within a global 
terrain,” (443). The imbalance of power and the role of imperialism necessary in understanding 
this study are covered through a review of political economic theory.  
Political Economy and Transnational Hegemony 
 Historical, political, and economic factors govern how state and non-state actors interact 
and coexist. Embodied history is present in all cultural, political and economic transactions, 
meaning nothing exists in a vacuum (Haraway 1988; Wolf 1982).   
Critical to my political economic examination of topics herein would be the framework 
of historical examination used by Ong (1999) who argues, in response to Sherry Ortner’s use of 
“modern practice theory” that an approach to political economy which disconnects it from the 
everyday human agency of non-state actors is flawed and we should rather “analyze people’s 
everyday actions as a form of cultural politics embedded in specific power contexts,” (5). Thus 
my study is concerned with the everyday actions and effects of technology embedded within 
larger systems of power.  
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 Critiques of neoliberal capitalism, imperialism, and the nature of segmented classes are 
critical to political economic theory and will be considered among my critiques of Chinese 
transnational hegemony and imperial power, which is bolstered by its increasing political and 
economic successes. Marxist and Gramscian theory are important in this regard.  
 Gramsci's concept of hegemony has been further defined by Mouffe (1979) as “a 
complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which will be brought 
about by one fundamental group and groups allied to it through the intermediary of 
ideology…[and is] able to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own by means of 
ideological struggle,” (181, emphasis original). This feeds into critiques of imperialism, a 
concept defined by Said (1993) as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating 
metropolitan center ruling a distant territory,” (9). I would argue, in agreement with other Tibet 
scholars (Norbu 1987; Smith Jr. 1997, 2008, 2010; Shakya 1999; Powers 2004; Harris 2014; 
McGranahan 2018) that such a definition applies to the Tibetan plateau region as well as those 
the state attempts to influence in diaspora.  
 Such imperial power and transnational hegemony is derived from the concept of “global 
governmentality” put forth by Ferguson and Gupta (2002), itself an extension of Gramsci’s 
“cultural hegemony” and Foucault’s (1991) concept of how states influence the conduct of 
citizens. The term “transnational hegemony” has been developed and expanded by William I. 
Robinson (2005, 2007, 2012, Robinson and Barrera 2012, 2015, 2018), who argues that the term 
denotes a particular form of hegemony in the global capitalist system, wherein specific social 
groups extend their influence through state apparatuses (such as the Chinese Communist Party). 
Importantly here, he has used the concept to critique to proliferation of state hegemony 
transnationally via a global capitalist elite and emergence of digital surveillance and subversion 
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methods (Robinson 2018). In this way, I analyze how state entities, such as the Chinese 
Communist Party, attempt to influence the conduct of those institutions and individuals (such as 
American activist groups and hotel employees) conventionally seen as outside their sphere of 
influence and how this becomes infinitely more effective through digital means. Also, I seek to 
understand how Tibetan activists and individuals deal with this Chinese state hegemony outside 
of China and if their use of technology such as WeChat, Twitter, or Facebook is counter 
hegemonic.  
  Given that these forms of technology to be studied are intensely connected to 
transnational corporations and politics (Bartley 2018), I am interested in how issues such as state 
censorship and governmentality affect global populations. For example, Castells (2007) 
examines various issues of power and counter-power in what he terms “the network society.” He 
is not necessarily referencing technology in this term, but it fits the subject well in that these 
technologies, such as Google and Facebook, are networked in a larger world system and create 
genuine consequences based on their internal use policies and implementation by users. 
Shoshana Zuboff (2019) examines this new age of “surveillance capitalism” in her recent 
landmark text on the subject, wherein she examines the tangible political and economic 
consequences of surveillance technologies. In chapter 3, I will spend some time discussing the 
issues related to global social media such as Facebook, WeChat, and the controversy surrounding 
Google’s “Project Dragonfly”, a controversial project which would create a search engine, 
powered by Google, and censored to the specification of the Chinese state.  
 In addition to corporations, transnational geopolitics and the work of NGOs will also be 
examined. As some scholars have examined in the context of other nation-states, (Baker-
Cristales 2008; Schuller 2012; Bernal and Grewal 2014) NGOs often engage in quasi if not de 
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facto government or state level operations. The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) is an 
example, among others, of such a phenomenon, as it attempts to fill the gaps for Tibetan exiles 
where their host countries fail them. For example, the CTA provides “green book” to act as a 
passport and a symbolic form of sovereignty to Tibetans living in exile. In addition, it seeks its 
own form of transnational governmentality in order to preserve “Tibetan-ness”.  
Agency and Digital Anthropology 
 This research is a continuation of a rich lineage of recent work in the subfield of digital 
anthropology. Beginning with the work of pioneering authors in other fields such as Sherry 
Turkle (1995), anthropologists turned to the internet and digital technology as ethnographic 
subjects (Miller and Slater 2000). The amount of research in the field since Daniel Miller’s 
founding papers (2003a, 2003b) and Boellstorff’s monumental Coming of Age in Second Life 
(2008) has exploded. Specifically, Daniel Miller has since examined Facebook in depth his work 
Tales from Facebook (2011) is relevant to this research. 
 One defining concept at the heart of digital anthropology is the distinction, or lack 
thereof, between digital/online practices and our physical reality. Originally defined as disparate 
spheres of being, digital anthropologists (with few holdouts) agrees that such distinctions are 
limited and ineffective. The digital is just as consequential, and at times more so, than physical 
actions, depending on circumstance. 
 In the case of diaspora studies, two anthropologists have contributed defining texts on 
digital technology and diaspora; however, as with other cases in digital anthropology, a scholar 
of media contributed the first. Katerina Diamandaki published her examination of what she 
called “virtual diasporas” in 2003 and marked the earliest examination of the subject. From there, 
anthropologists like Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2009) and Victoria Bernal (2014) published 
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examinations of the digital side of their respective diasporic cultures of study. The latter of these 
two specifically examined the role of the state in transnational social fields (to use terms by 
Schiller (2005) and Bourdieu (1977)). What all of these scholarly works examine is the agency 
of diasporic participants in their transnational communities and how digital technologies make 
the maintenance of nation and community easier. 
 Digital agency will be an important continuing concern throughout this text. I am 
interested in the everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985) often overlooked in larger studies. 
There are subtle ways in which Tibetans navigate digital waters that escape or resist censorship 
such as through YouTube videos (Warner 2013) and blogging (Kehoe 2015). Tibetan activist 
groups, as well as activist groups in general, will often use social media to spread information 
about their cause. Though we are well past the time when the “Free Tibet” movement was its 
fever pitch and the issue recedes further into obscurity, these groups remain active and adapt to 
changing technology and even adapt their cause to new geopolitical realities. These “freedom 
technologists”, as John Postill (2014) calls them, use technology to their advantage and point to 
its importance in everyday activities. 
 My interest in such freedom technologists and technologies lies in the agency of the 
individual to resist the discursive practice of the state. Specifically, the agency of those at the 
margins of the state (or the stateless) is interesting, considering that some Tibetan exiles will 
literally refuse the acknowledgement of the state, such as India, because it would undermine their 
claim to sovereignty as a community (McGranahan 2018).   
 In addition to the use of technology for agency’s sake, I am also interested in the ways in 
which Tibetans express identity and community through digital media. Faye Ginsburg (2002) 
examined the use of media in indigenous or marginalized cultures and suggested that “when 
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other forms are no longer effective, indigenous media offers a possible means---social, cultural, 
and political---for reproducing and transforming cultural identity among people who have 
experienced massive political, geographic, and economic disruption (217). And her prediction 
proved correct not only for indigenous forms of media, but for many cultures of displaced or 
marginalized status that use such technology to “mediate culture”.  
 While technologies such as social media, VPN services, and encrypted messaging 
applications aid in such things as human agency, resistance, and general convenience, there are 
confounding factors and consequences of the same technologies that crack the image of a digital 
utopia. Firstly, as I have pointed out above, the Internet is a technology equally at the disposal of 
state level authorities, allowing them easier access to the everyday life of the individual. This 
ranges from accessing shopping lists and stored information on devices to the location and audio 
of you and your surroundings. As such, they can be dangerous for those outside of the ruling 
class or its allies.  
 In 2018 alone, Facebook came under fire twice for two separate scandals. The most 
prescient was the platform allowing hate speech to be disseminated on its site by users in 
Myanmar which, according to UN investigators, was partly responsible for efforts of ethnic 
cleansing brought about both by the Myanmar state and the majority Buddhist population against 
the Rohingya Muslim minority in 2017 (Stecklow 2018). Outside of social media technologies, 
some scholars have pointed out that there is great bias in search engine results that reinforce our 
own cultural norms and hegemonic processes (Zuckerman 2013; Noble 2018), while others like 
Ramesh Srinivasan (2017) explicitly identify the imperial nature of the internet, given that access 
to such technology is limited in the “developing” world. Understanding how we are limited by 
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technology is equally important to knowing how we can use that technology for applied/activist 
purposes and that is one of the larger aims of this research.  
Methods 
This research was conducted through qualitative research methods common to 
ethnography. Within this broad category, my methods can be divided into two, those taking place 
in a physical and digital environment. Preference for data collection was given to digital methods 
for two reasons. First, my location and funding limited my ability to recruit participants in 
person. More than that, however, was that physical Tibetan refugee communities are scattered 
and limited within the Midwest. The second reason for the digital focus is that the project deals 
with Tibetan activist communities online. Therefore, traditional physical ethnography pales in 
effectiveness compared to what I could glean from online interactions.  
Traditional Ethnographic Method 
 I employed traditional ethnographic methods for my study of physical environments. For 
recruitment, I engaged in participant observation in Tibetan religious and activist sites. For these, 
I attended events at the Tibetan Mongolian Buddhist Cultural Center in Bloomington, IN and, 
primarily, the Tibetan Alliance of Chicago. I also spoke with activists within Indianapolis, IN at 
two events when they were present for public engagement, and meeting with 5-10 individuals 
per occasion. At these sites, I would introduce myself and network in order to find more 
participants for my study. Participants for this part of the research were semi-limited1 to second 
and third generation Tibetan migrants between the ages of 18-35, irrespective of gender. The 
reasoning behind this is that I wanted to see how digital technologies affected diaspora 
                                              
1 I did not exclude willing participants if they were above the age restriction. None of my semi-formal interviews 
were outside the age restriction. 
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maintenance for individuals generations removed from a shared homeland. I wanted to discern if 
this made digital connections in diaspora more or less important. When I found a willing 
participant, I would invite them to an interview either in person or through an online service such 
as Skype. I interviewed three participants in this way. First, a 42 year old man named Tashi, who 
was born in India and moved to the US in the 1990s. The following two interviewees were both 
in their early twenties and were female. Pema was born and raised in India and has only lived in 
the US for a very short time. Pasang, by contrast, was born and raised in Boston. Their 
differences highlighted as much of interest as their similarities. These interviews were semi-
formal in nature and all followed the same initial script of questions with varying follow-up 
questions as I found necessary (Bernard 2011).  
 At the conclusion of these interviews as well as more informal meetings, I would provide 
participants with my business card and request that they spread the word about my study to other 
possible participants. Morgan (2008) identifies this method as “snowball sampling” and involves 
finding initial participants who can then refer the researcher to other participants. This was a 
promising method for my study as I was not already embedded within the Tibetan refugee 
community, but yielded little participants for one reason or another. In at least one of these 
instances, potential participants were not eager to speak with me due to the controversial nature 
of the research study. Weaknesses in this method generally are identified through initial 
participants having too much authority in the sampling. This, however, was partially rectified 
through a diverse range of initial, disconnected informants.  
 Each interview’s audio was recorded with permission from participants in order for me to 
transcribe at a later date. This allowed me to focus on the interview and probe for more thorough 
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discussion and ask important follow-up questions. In addition, I was able to record specific times 
in my field notes so that I could remember details from that moment in the recording.  
 An important final note for my physical methods deals with the limited population 
sampled in the study. Given that the Tibetan refugee community in the Midwest is small, I have 
taken extra care in avoiding identifying characteristics in my writing. All participants are given 
pseudonyms. In order to further mitigate the possibility of identification, I reference the age and 
sex of the individual being referenced, but not what city I spoke to them in. The exception to this 
is in the case of Chicago, which I felt was large and important enough that I rarely identify when 
a participant references the city. This cautious treatment of identities is expected by ethical 
researchers, of course, but becomes doubly important based on the nature of my research. For 
example, some participants were concerned that loved ones within China may be negatively 
affected if Chinese officials discovered that they participated. Some would not agree to 
participate specifically because I was dealing with Chinese authority and the internet.  
Digital Ethnographic Method 
 Digital ethnography has been examined and outlined by a number of scholars in the past 
two decades. Some describe the methods of digital ethnography as a transplant of traditional 
ethnography to the digital environment (Kozinets 2015) or the application of anthropological 
methods to studies involving digital technology (Pink et al. 2016). Many describe an entirely 
digital approach that finds the ethnographer embedded in online communities without ever 
necessarily meeting the physical counterparts (Boellstorf 2008; Nardi 2010; Boellstorf et al. 
2012).  
 As a whole, this research falls somewhere along the middle of the spectrum. The bulk of 
my data comes from online interactions such as comments on online forums, but it is not limited 
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to this environment, as noted above. All such data is gathered from sources that are publicly 
available and require no explicit informed consent for inclusion. Any comment or post that 
requires a password or membership to access was not included in this study. These arenas of 
discourse provide a large area for data collection and can show a spectrum of participation within 
the Tibetan community online.  
 Miller and Slater (2000) were one of the first to examine the internet as an ethnographic 
subject and break apart the myth, if doubters still remain, that the digital and physical realms are 
separate realities. The example of Roy Jones alone evidences this. However, in addition to 
studying digital environments, I also wish to understand how Tibetan refugee community 
members embody technology in their everyday lives. This approach, specifically, is examined by 
Dourish (Dourish 2001; Dourish and Bell 2011) and Pink et al. (2016), who examine the 
ubiquitous nature of digital technology and provide a framework for examining the subtle ways it 
changes everyday life. For this research, my interviews specifically target how Tibetan 
community members embody digital technology such as social media. In this, I am less 
concerned with the devices as I am with applications and the discourses within them.  
Data Analysis 
 Transcribed data was analyzed through an inductive text analysis (Bernard 2011). My 
data and conclusions are drawn from my observations in the field and in interviews, meaning my 
conclusions are based on what my data lead me to, not based on my preconceived notions. As 
themes became apparent, I would highlight and make note of certain repetitions and draw my 
conclusions from there. As for data gathered on digital platforms, this too was inductively 
analyzed for emerging themes. Specifically, however, I searched these comments for evidence of 
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certain patterns of participation within activist communities and their engagement with political 
topics.  
 
Limitations and Final Notes 
 Some limiting factors in my research methods should be noted here. First, I am an 
English speaking researcher working with Tibetan and Chinese speaking populations. I have 
limited my selection of research participants to those who spoke English. In one instance, I did 
translate internet comments from a YouTube video (examined in Chapter 2) using Google 
Translate and checked the work through a Chinese speaking friend. Criticism of this approach is 
understandable and I even sympathize. I only relied on that method for one set of comments due 
to their importance in the setting I was analyzing. Past that, all data handled was originated in 
English.  
 Next, I must note the limitations of my funding and time in completing this project. 
Travel funding was not viable for this research and I therefore relied on proximity in participant 
recruitment and observation. Tibetans tend to gather in communities in which they were resettled 
after fleeing the Chinese state. According to a Central Tibetan Administration CTA survey, 
released in 2009, the majority of the Tibetan exile community lives in the Himalayan region 
(India, Nepal, and Bhutan). The survey labelled almost the remaining 18,920 surveyed 
individuals as living “elsewhere”.2 This “elsewhere” contains large populations of Tibetans in 
Switzerland (the first Western state to accept Tibetan refugees), France, Sweden, and England. 
North America maintains significant populations in Toronto, New York, Boston, Chicago, and, 
to a lesser extent, Louisville and Indianapolis. My location of central Indiana is not poorly suited 
                                              
2 https://web.archive.org/web/20110927215516/http://www.hindustantimes.com/127935-Tibetans-living-outside-
Tibet-Tibetan-survey/Article1-634405.aspx 
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for this research, but it was not ideal either. I travelled to meet with individuals up to four hours 
away and even then, few agreed to sit down with me for interviews.  
The bulk of my data, therefore, had to be gathered remotely. This suits the research topic, 
as I am primarily concerned with online activities; however, it is a limitation which must be 
noted. Moreover, several of the social media groups in which Tibetan youth participate are 
private and therefore are unethical to include in this research data. Therefore, I rely on that data 
which is publically available.  
Finally, some readers might note a critical tone of Chinese perspectives and a lack of 
focus on Chinese participants as a whole. In part, the lack of Chinese perspective is due to a 
constraint on the focus of this project as comparing both perspectives would add far too much to 
the scope. Therefore, I focus primarily on the Tibetan perspective, which I argue is crucial in 
Chapter 2. That being said, I do not ignore the Chinese perspective and examine instances of 
conflict often from both sides for a more complex understanding of both.  
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Chapter 2: Historical Narrative and the Politics of Memory 
 
Introduction 
 The history of Tibet and Tibetans-in-Exile has been intensely documented elsewhere (I 
will cover this below, but for good introductions to the subject see: Norbu 1987; Goldstein 1997; 
Shakya 1999; van Schaik 2011). Instead, this chapter focuses on the use of history and memory 
and draws distinctions between the two terms. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how 
collective cultural and historical memory as well as politics shapes the historical narrative 
regarding Tibet. More broadly, the chapter focuses on reviewing how cultural memory and 
historical narrative affect present cultural identity and expression among Tibetan refugees and 
how these processes both shape and are shaped by modern political considerations.  
In that vein, there are a number of questions that require addressing. What does the 
debate and construction of historical narrative mean for Tibetans in diaspora and the politics of 
memory? How have both Tibetans and non-Tibetans contributed to the media narrative in the 
West and how were those stories transmitted? Perhaps most importantly, this chapter seeks to 
examine how Tibetans living in the West, specifically North America, use history and memory to 
contextualize their own identities and goals, leading all the way up into the present digital age.  
History and the Politics of Memory 
Trouillot (1995) argued that the historical narrative is constructed by those whose power 
dictated the “truth”. History is written by the victors. In his view, the constructivist approach to 
history is to view history as “one fiction among others,” (6). His argument that history is a 
“bundle of silences” which privilege the memory of some subjects (people, events, narratives) 
and encourages the forgetting of others. This is how history, or rather, memory, is constructed in 
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the narratives of various groups. This process has become known as the “politics of memory”.3 
For this chapter, it is important to examine the subject of historical narrative, social memory, and 
power as it pertains to ethnohistory and Tibetans in diaspora. 
 It is good to begin with a distinction between the terms “history”, or historical narrative, 
and “memory”. Maurice Halbwach was one of the first to deal with the concept of social 
memory and defined it as “a social reality, transmitted and sustained through the conscious 
efforts and institutions groups,” (Yerushalmi 1982, xv: cited in Climo and Cattell 2002). Climo 
and Cattell (2002) expanded on his definitions of social memory by arguing that “collective or 
social memories are shaped by social, economic, and political circumstances; by beliefs and 
values; by opposition and resistance,” and also that they are deeply connected to “issues of 
authenticity, identity, and power,” (4). Therefore the discussion of the subject of memory and 
historical narrative are integral to cultural studies in any case, but especially when dealing with 
communities such as Tibetans in North America, whose cultural, political, and economic 
prosperity hinge on the telling of history and what is considered “truth”.  
 One particular silence was noted by Philip Marfleet (2007) to be that of forced migrants 
or refugees. He begins his article by specifically quoting Trouillot (1995) in that “history is the 
fruit of power,” (136). Marfleet is interested in the politics of memory as it is connected to the 
nation-state and the globalized world and engages in a review of the history of the concept of the 
refugee. Pointing to a debate between scholars on whether the concept of the refugee began with 
the nation-state or has been a fact of life since time immemorial, Marfleet notes that 
contemporary examinations of refugee studies have been particularly ahistorical, as if the 
                                              
3 The scholarship on this subject is enormous and the term’s origin is ambiguous and widely used without credit to a 
single scholar; however, it tends to be agreed that the beginnings of such discussions occur around the subject of 
post-WWII Germany and how German citizens remembered the Nazi era.  
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conflicts or circumstances leading to forced migration sprung up like flashes in a pan. This is a 
mistake, he argues, as “denial of refugee histories is part of the process of denying refugee 
realities,” (137). In essence, the concept of the refugee cannot be ahistorical as it erases or 
delegitimizes the lived experience and memory of refugee groups.  
This is immediately important when reviewing the case of Tibetans in exile, whom, since 
1959, when the Dalai Lama fled into exile, have captured the attention of both civilian and 
academic minds regarding what has come to be known as “the Tibetan sovereignty debate” or 
the “Tibet Question” (Goldstein 1997). This debate surrounding the legitimacy of the Tibetan 
state has spawned a large amount of historical arguments and historiography, to the point where 
significant texts comparing the varying perspectives on the issue have been undertaken (Powers 
2004). Where Marfleet fits into this is in the necessity of such historical undertakings, but with 
particular attention paid to how Tibetans use history in their own social memory.  
Carole McGranahan (2005, 2010) tackles this exact issue in her examinations of history 
and the Tibetan diaspora. She argues that “for Tibetans in exile, history is caught between what 
‘really happened’ and the epistemic murk of historical memory,” (2005, 570). She too cites 
Trouillot’s concept of the “bundle of silences” and extends it by noting how marginalized groups 
may also choose to withhold certain parts of their histories for political or strategic advantage. 
She calls these forms of histories “arrested”. They are not erased, as they may be reserved for 
some possible future in which they might be advantageous to recall. Alternatively, these arrested 
histories may also be withheld in order to safeguard the community from perceived danger.  
More importantly, McGranahan’s article examines the importance of history in the 
political struggle of Tibetan resistance. In this way, the politics of memory takes on double 
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meaning in that the politics of censorship can define historical memory, but also in that memory 
is inherently political.  
All of these arguments lend themselves to larger theories of the politics of memory. In 
multiple different levels of grouping, historical narrative is constructed and strategically silenced 
based on systemic power structures. This can range from the way the past is maintained in the 
present for social groups, the “arresting” of narratives within groups (McGranahan 2005, 2010), 
or the delegitimization of troublesome political entities by the state (Marfleet 2007). How we 
understand history and memory are therefore important to how we understand larger political 
and economic entities such as those on the margins as well as the state. It also provides scholars 
with some medium between the postmodernist absolutes identified by Trouillot as positivism and 
constructivism, in that social memory would be the deployment of certain “truths” of the past 
which are dependent on perspective, and history is that which can be identified with some 
measure of objectivity.  
 Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob (1995) recognize that the concept of the historical narrative (as 
post-modernists see it) and objectivity are overly dichotomized and that there exists room 
between the extremes for historians to work within. More interesting to me here is their 
examination of the “meta-narrative” or the way that we talk about and use history.  
The Tibet Question 
Since 1950 a strong debate has existed within the Western consciousness as well as 
scholarly canon around the question of Tibetan sovereignty and whether or not China’s claim of 
suzerainty over the region is historically and legally valid.  
Tibetans have argued strongly against the claim; however, they were not proactive 
enough following de facto independence in 1911 to establish themselves as de jure independent 
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(Goldstein 1997; HH the Dalai Lama 1962). Since then, Tibetans have tried to frame their 
struggle as one of human rights in the region and have shifted from a goal of independence and 
sovereignty to one of genuine autonomy while respecting Chinese suzerainty.  
Tibetans in the west vary as any group does, but typically, they hold that Tibet was 
independent prior to 1950. And they were by all accounts de facto independent following the fall 
of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 (Goldstein 1997; Norbu 1987; Smith Jr. 1996, 2008; Shakya 1999; 
van Shaik 2011). In addition, they argue that historical facts used to discredit this claim are more 
complex than Chinese sources would suggest. The non-profit organization “Free Tibet” even 
dedicates a page of their website to disproving what they identify as six key arguments China 
uses to claim authority in Tibet (these can be found here: https://www.freetibet.org/about/china-
argument). 
Of these arguments, there is one that I find of particular note and will examine here. 
Chinese sources argue that Tibet was a theocratic serfdom before their PLA military forces 
“liberated” the region in 1950. Further, Chinese sources claim that under the feudal serfdom 
conditions, 95% of the Tibetan population was oppressed by barbarism. Tibetans deny this as 
being the case and the testimony from those with experience in old Tibet reported no such 
extreme cases. That being said, sources like Heinrich Harrer (1954) and Dawa Norbu (1987) 
both report that forced labor did occur and some evidence does suggest that harsh punishments 
were enacted on offending citizens (such as cutting off limbs and eye gouging).  
Modern Tibetans do not keep this in their memory; rather, they negotiate what is relevant 
in the current era. For example, Pasang noted in an oral interview that individuals with ties to the 
elite class in historic Tibet would condemn such practices. In her words: 
I think there's an unspoken thing where lots of Tibetans, especially in exile, have been 
exposed to many of the young people. They know that just because Tibet went through a 
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lot of bad things, that doesn't mean Tibet was a perfect Shangri la before, you know, 
people acknowledge that there were problems… So I know from like from word of 
mouth there is even like, there is still some animosity actually even to this day, even 
amongst Tibetans of my generation where they feel that there was an aristocratic caste of 
Tibetans that basically exploited the rest of the population and indirectly led to the loss of 
our country and our homeland basically. So, although they blame, the main blame is 
always on the Chinese I think because obviously they're the ones who perpetrated this 
like this whole oppression of Tibet. There is like a soft level, like a little kind of like side 
feeling of like anger towards those other Tibetans who exploited their own people. I think 
if Tibet was a free country there would be a day of reckoning where people would say 
this political system needs to change. You know what I mean? 
 
She went on to note that Tibetans who are descended from the aristocracy and are of her 
age group have told her that they are fiercely proud of their heritage, but would condemn their 
ancestors if the atrocities the Chinese accuse them of were true. These forms of negotiating 
memory are what Mieke Bal (1999) might call an act of “cultural memory”, in that it is 
performed at an individual and social level in ways that one may or may not be conscious of 
(vii). In this case, younger Tibetans are keenly aware of their cultural memory and even 
negotiate what they choose to embody within their own identities. This is important for how 
these negotiations and arguments play out in cyberspace, but first, I must expand on how 
historical narrative is used against Tibetans. 
The Serf 
Figure 2.1 shows a very common image to be found in Chinese cyberspace. I first came 
across the image in November of 2018 and have been shocked by how often I see it across the 
internet. A quick Google search for “Tibetan serf” shows it as the first result. Often, I have seen 
this image posted in forums and, most recently, in an article on WeChat responding to the term 
“Free Tibet”.  Regardless of its medium, the image is always deployed to represent the same 
thing: the unflinching cruelty of Tibetan serfdom prior to Chinese liberation in 1950.  It is often 
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used in the same context as images of body mutilations and other such punishments said to have 
been enacted upon the Tibetan populace. 
 
Figure 2.1 
  
 I searched extensively for any metadata I could find that would help me to identify the 
subject of the image, but I found none. The image never comes with an accompanying citation 
nor any reference to where it was taken, by whom, or even when. All the information the reader 
receives from the poster is that it is an image of a Tibetan serf prior to 1950 and this is important 
because it fits into the Chinese state narrative that Tibet was a barbarous wasteland before being 
liberated. Notice the man’s gaunt, haggard features, his tattered clothes, and especially the chains 
around his neck and hands. Perhaps the reason this image is widely circulated online is due to 
how very well this image supports the Chinese historical narrative. There is even a holiday for it 
in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in China called “Serf Emancipation Day” that 
commemorates March 28, 1959 when China officially denounced the Dalai Lama and his 
government. Every year, Chinese cyberspace is filled with such images that remind readers of 
China’s moral authority in the region.  
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 This in itself is an act of memory rather than historical narrative, because the author of 
the post using the above image is attributing importance to the image. They are making the claim 
that it proves their cultural memory correct, despite its dubious nature as a primary source.  
Serfdom Contested 
 Tibetans do not outright reject the narrative perpetuated by the Chinese sources, but they 
do contest them. Recall Pasang’s quote above and how she notes that the system of Old Tibet 
was dated and would very likely have been overthrown eventually had Tibet been allowed to 
progress independently. However, this acknowledgement is a very small part of what makes their 
contested history so interesting. 
 If we understand China as an imperial force in the Tibetan region, the narrative and 
cultural memory produced by Tibetans in diaspora forms what Linda Tuhiwai-Smith (2012) 
called “counter storytelling”. Counter storytelling occurs when the story or narrative of a 
marginalized group is told or exposed where it might otherwise be suppressed or ignored. 
Tibetans online tell their side of the story and subvert the ideas of history perpetuated by the 
state. Thanks to cyberspace, this even works transnationally and demonstrates agency on the part 
of the Tibetan netizen.4 In a most interesting conference paper presented by Séagh Kehoe in 
2017, the use of “old photos” online as a form of counter-storytelling which underwrites the 
“Serf Emancipation Day” narrative is examined in depth. He notes that some users will share 
images of Qing Dynasty China and Han Chinese as a counter to the images of Tibetans and will 
                                              
4 The term netizen refers to any habitual user of the internet. Commonly within digital scholarship, it is used to 
denote users who actively engage in online communities or work to make the internet a more open and social 
resource. 
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post arguments such as “Old China: One billion serfs” and “Have the Han serfs been liberated 
yet?”5 
 Since 1959, Tibetans have noted their loss and decried the continual threats to their 
culture (the Dalai Lama chief among them). Pasang noted this earlier when she referred to the 
loss of the Tibetan homeland. She also noted that “every Tibetan born in exile is born an 
activist”, quoting another young Tibetan. This phrase specifically is important to how Tibetans 
engage with history in cyberspace. Often they will open with a reference to a lost homeland (see 
Axel 2002, 2004) and follow with how this cultural recollection of loss affects them and draws 
similarities to indigenous communities experiencing persistent structural harm due to settler 
colonialism. This is poignantly illustrated in three ways. First, Tibetans in diaspora grapple with 
a loss of homeland and a suppression of their history which actively disenfranchises them from 
their family, their connection to important physical places such as spiritual sites and cities, and 
their cultural heritage. Secondly, the very nature of diaspora is to be dispersed within 
communities in which one is “othered”. My participants noted that only one community in 
Toronto, which they affectionately called “Little Tibet”, made them feel particularly welcomed 
due to a notable concentration of Tibetans which allowed for one to walk down the street “and 
see nothing but Tibetan faces” as Pasang told me. Finally, the hegemonic authority of Chinese 
imperialism tends to find its way into the everyday lives of Tibetans no matter where they live. 
 In fact, much of the narrative focusing on Tibet since 1959 has been, from perspective of 
Tibetans and Westerners, a humanitarian crisis. I analyzed over 100 article samples from the 
New York Times between the years 1959 and 2015 in order to discern the dominant patterns in 
Western news media surrounding the purposefully broad term “Tibet”. I used a number of digital 
                                              
5 https://seaghkehoe.com/2017/09/08/imagining-the-past-old-photo-sharing-among-tibetan-netizens-in-chinese-
cyberspace/ 
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tools such as Voyant and Palladio to code the data. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of my 
data.  
Figure 2.2: This image tabulates the data regarding mentions of Tibet by year. I have divided them into 
“Eras” based on both crests in the data and relevant historical markers. 
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Figure 2.3: This image is a Palladio network visualization of all of the eras. Terms that go outward are 
specific to the Era Node and those connecting in the center are common to two or more. In short, terms 
appearing in the center are common to all eras and terms to the sides are specific to certain ones. This 
identifies patterns in historical dialogues centering on Tibet (at least in the New York Times). 
  
Two eras are of particular importance here. First, in Era 1 (1959-1969), I noted a pattern 
of general anxiety in the tone of the articles regarding communist expansion in the region. 
Articles referenced terms such as the "Red Army", "Red Chinese", and the "Communist Threat", 
which is indicative of the "Red Scare" mentality in the United States at the time. Little regard 
was paid to the Tibetan people and Chinese control of the region was generally discussed to be 
strategic. The map image in Figure 2.4 comes from one such article (“Tibet---ABC of a Remote 
Land” 1959) and demonstrates this rather clearly. 
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Figure 2.4 
 
 At the time, Tibetans had not yet been dispersed across the globe as refugees and 
contributed little to the narrative in Western spheres of consciousness. This changes significantly 
in the following eras, when keywords such as “culture”, “people”, and (especially) “human 
rights” begin to take center stage. Figure 2.5 is a still image of a Voyant Cirrus data visualization 
that shows the results of Era 3 (1987-2001). I find this era particularly interesting, as the term 
“human-rights” shows up as significantly as the Dalai Lama’s name. Tibetans had much more 
visibility in the West at this point and the “Free Tibet” movement was at its peak. The Dalai 
Lama has risen to celebrity status in the West (much to China’s consternation) and Tibetan 
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memoirs and histories were being published for English speaking audiences (HH Dalai Lama 
1962; Gyatso 1997; Norbu 1986; Shakya 1999).  
 
Figure 2.5 
 The Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace prize in 1989 and several Tibetan non-profits begin 
at this time. Notably, one of the more active groups as of this writing was founded in this Era. 
“Students for a Free Tibet” began as a charter-based organization to support the Tibetan 
Independence movement in 1994 in New York City. They rose in prominence thanks in part to 
their proliferation through American and Canadian university campuses at the height of the “Free 
Tibet” and also through their connection with the popular “Tibetan Freedom Concerts” held in 
the latter half of the 90s. These events featured Tibetan speakers and activists and proceeds went 
to Tibetan activist organizations (Strauss 1996; van Gelder 1998).  
Memory and Identity Online 
The below images were taken from a Tibetan meme-group (to be examined further in 
later chapters). In these images, the difference between historical narrative and memory is made 
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plain using Tibetan-posted images. Figure 2.6 demonstrates the irritation Tibetans feel when they 
try to explain their history to outsiders. Specifically, when their narratives are rejected or the 
underlying importance of the historical context they are trying to convey is ignored, it causes 
them significant irritation. One user in the above image notes: “bruh I spent like ~10 minutes 
tryin to explain to my chinese friend the whole tibet thing and at the end she just said “…so ur 
southwestern chinese.” bitch I threw HANDS.” This colloquial expression “threw hands” 
typically means that an attack was attempted or launched, but in the context of the post, it is 
being used as hyperbole to express her dissatisfaction with her friend’s assessment of her as 
merely “Southwestern Chinese”. 
 
Figure 2.6 
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Figure 2.7 
To Tibetans, such erasure is a common complaint and it provides some motivation to the 
development of the “counter narrative” (Tuhui-Smith 2012) against Chinese imperial power, 
which, in place of settler colonialism, engages in the same systemic and persistent suppression of 
Tibetan stories and histories. In addition, the assessment and labeling of Tibetans as Chinese first 
and Tibetan second is viewed as an insult because it “silences” their historical perspective. In 
fact, many Chinese netizens view the Tibetan counter-narrative as specifically fictitious.  This 
demonstrates all three factors of what Trouillot (1995) described as history as social process. He 
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argued that individuals are involved in this process at once as “1) agents, or occupants of 
structural positions; 2) as actors in constant interface with a context; and 3) as subjects, that is, as 
voices aware of their own vocality,” (23). In the above example, users are aware of their vocality 
and contribute to the historical process through creating texts such as these memes and 
discussing them in forums. They share their frustrations and reinforce their own historical 
narratives. 
Now, examining the second image (Figure 2.7) evidences something different, but related 
to historical narrative and the social process of history. This image is striking to me for a number 
of reasons, but chief among them is that it is a humorous take on a profound issue for those 
living in diaspora. First, consider the concept of Tibet’s existence. It exists as geography, yes, but 
currently as a part of China. Maps will sometimes leave mention of Tibet off entirely in 
exchange for either the Chinese term for the region (Xizang, which means Western Tsang) as the 
CIA did in 1979 (Figure 2.8) or not reference provinces at all and label China as a whole on 
political maps, which reflect the political reality (Figure 2.9).  
Second, and more importantly, the meme (Figure 2.7) feeds into shared Tibetan diasporic 
identity as being internalized (“in the heart”) as well as anxieties tend to revolve around the 
assimilation of unique Tibetan culture into that of the Chinese majority. This is common among 
many indigenous and diasporic groups, but can be more pronounced in this case due to 
antagonistic feelings stemming from those who are pro-assimilation. For example, a common 
comment I find on forums come from users who write things like “Tibet does not exist” or “stop 
making up countries”. When challenged, they tend to respond “learn history”.  
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Figure 2.8: Image credit: CIA 1979 
 
Figure 2.9: Image credit CIA 2008 
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 An example of one of these such exchanges is found in Figure 2.10, where a, presumably, 
Chinese user antagonizes others over a National Geographic video showcasing the Potala Palace 
on YouTube, even though the video makes no specific point about Tibetan sovereignty and 
specifically notes the region as a part of China. 
 
Figure 2.10 
 Other examples exist within cyberspace. For example, returning to the example of 
YouTube comments, a user uploaded a video in September 2018 specifically asking “Is Tibet a 
Country?”6 The purpose of the channel is to educate viewers on geography, one of many such 
niched subject channels. In this video, he explains to the viewer the history of the Tibetan 
Empire, but does not touch on the “Tibet Question”. Rather, he examines the semantics of what a 
                                              
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLmAfySHWRc 
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“country” is, arguing that it meets the definition in some regards, but is firmly within the 
government of China. Commenters seem to have taken issue with the question itself, providing 
sarcastic responses to the video. These are shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12. 
 
Figure 2.11 
 
Figure 2.12 
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 English speaking readers will note that in the first of these images (Figure 2.11), the 
commenters are mocking the video’s topic and arguing that Tibet is but another example of 
“conquest” and should be accepted. This is also a common narrative lodged at Native Americans 
and other indigenous people. Essentially, these comments argue, that cultures and people who 
were dispossessed of their land and sovereignty are simply consequences of being the “losing” 
side. In this, they represent the positivist perspective of history and evidence what Trouillot 
(1995) said about that perspective: “At best, history is a story about power, a story about those 
who won,” (5).  
 Figure 2.12 shows a different perspective, those of Chinese users. Here, user Chen L 
notes that “This doesn’t mention the serfdom of Tibet before liberation.”7 The following two 
users reply that these videos are only meant to irritate the Chinese audience and are of little 
consequence. User Jun Peter provides an interesting response:  
@杨明 is not anti-China. To be honest, it is true that Tibet has its own national culture 
and language. Strictly speaking, it can become an independent country. But the video 
finally said that he does not think that Tibet is an independent country, but hopes to give 
Tibetans a little more freedom. 
 
This text exchange goes on for a while longer, with most Chinese-speaking users arguing against 
Jun, stating that “if you think this, maybe you should have been born a serf 70 years ago,” (this is 
actually the highlighted text in Figure 2.12).  
 In this kind of historical narrative, Tibetans consistently have their heritage demonized 
and minimized. Therefore, scattered from their homeland with many now never having seen it, 
Tibet exists within their heritage and their own cultural memories. They recognize, as noted 
                                              
7 This image was translated in three ways. First, I put the sentences into Google Translate and checked a Chinese-
English dictionary for further accuracy. To check my work, I asked a friend (from China) to check my work. This is 
the only moment in my research that required translation. It should rightly be noted that I do not speak Chinese 
fluently and that my translations rely on outside resources.  
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herein, the less glamorous aspects of their histories, but more than anything are connected 
through shared cultural memory. Tibet is in their hearts, so to speak (Figure 2.6).  
 Brian Axel (2002, 2004) has proposed that those in diaspora are connected more by 
remembered violence than by a geographic homeland and I concur. In this case, their 
dispossession unites them as much as their shared history and they perform and engage with acts 
of cultural memory (Bal, Crewe, Spitzer 1999) constantly whether that be in the form of internet 
memes or arguments about identity. 
Conclusion: The “Use” of History and the Politics of Memory 
With the help of Western activists and institutions, including several resolutions passed 
by Congress, Tibetans in exile communities in both physical and digital environments examined 
herein have made great strides in crafting their own counter-narratives (Tuhiwai-Smith 2012) to 
China’s imperial historical narrative. Tibetan counter-narratives online show how individuals in 
diasporic communities negotiate and defend their perspectives in challenging environments. It 
also demonstrates how they craft their own online spaces where they can share in similar acts of 
memory and cultural recall. They can bond over the struggles of having to defend their histories 
and their stories against those who would erase, denigrate, or minimize them. 
What makes the digital age more interesting to this discussion of the politics of memory 
is that it provides new challenges to traditional historical narrative. While conspiracy and false 
information are rampant, the internet has provided marginalized groups with an arena in which to 
negotiate their history and social memory. Moreover, the politics of memory become more 
complex given the globalizing effect the internet brings about. It is a double-edged sword which 
will present issues throughout this thesis. Homi Bhaba (2004) wrote that the location of culture 
can be found in the texts we create and how these texts are deployed and negotiated. In the case 
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of Tibetans in diaspora, the texts they create, disseminate, and debate, especially historical ones, 
are integral to their political, economic, and cultural survival. Therefore, understanding the 
politics of social memory and its implications for historical narrative is integral to the subjects 
discussed hereafter. As will be seen throughout this thesis, the common themes of loss, 
retribution, and intergenerational conflict are heavily integrated into modern Tibetan struggles in 
both personal and political arenas. 
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Chapter 3: Digital Technologies, Ethnolinguistics, and Transnational 
Connection 
 
 Several media technologies make it possible for transnational groups to connect with one 
another. Each of my participants were asked how often they use social media. Younger 
participants reported using digital media technologies between 15-20 hours per week. When 
asked to what extent those hours were devoted to specifically Tibetan related activities (articles, 
pages, discussions), all participants reported that this easily made up 2/3 of that time. This 
chapter provides background on the various technologies Tibetan-Americans in my study use on 
a daily basis. Based on participant responses and from information observed online, I have 
identified the applications they use and have ordered them here by importance.  
WeChat 
 By far participants noted WeChat as the dominant application in use by Tibetans around 
the world. In fact, WeChat is such a ubiquitous feature of Chinese, Tibetan, and Bhutanese lives 
that it has become a sort of “one app fits all” technology. Pema went as far as to state that where 
Americans might ask for one’s phone number when asking another person on a date, a Tibetan 
would ask for their WeChat ID. WeChat functions as an instant messaging service, a social 
media network, a news app, and even a mobile game platform. It rivals Facebook in its ubiquity 
and its multipurpose design. 
 Facebook was banned in China in 2009 after discovering that Uygur activists in Xinjiang 
were using the platform for communication.8 This, coupled with the conflict between the 
Chinese state and Google in the early 2000s taught a valuable lesson: the state needed to be in 
control of media technology within the country. 
                                              
8 http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90882/6697993.html  
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 Accordingly, when WeChat was developed in 2010 by Tencent Holdings Unlimited (a 
multinational technology conglomerate based in China and intimately connected with the 
Chinese state) it had to comply with Chinese state censorship laws. Last year, the application 
boasted over 1 billion monthly active users worldwide (Hollander 2018).9 
 Use of WeChat is controversial within the Tibetan community. Most Tibetan individuals 
living in diaspora will use the app, as it has become so ubiquitous among Tibetan users both 
inside and outside of China, but how readily they “trust” or approve of its use varies. There is a 
prevalent understanding among users that their actions within the app are being monitored and 
therefore, they avoid certain activities. For example, the use of the Dalai Lama’s image in any 
regard is avoided due to the possible consequences it can bring to users within China. For 
example, CitizenLab of the University of Toronto has reported repeatedly on censorship on the 
app (Ruan, Knockel, and Crete-Nishihata 201710; Crete-Nishihata et al. 201811; Knockel, Ruan, 
Crete-Nishihata, Deibert 201812; Kenyon 201813; Ruan, Knockel, Ng, and Crete-Nishihata 
201814; Ruan, Dalek, and Knockel 201915).  and the Tibetan Action Institute (TAI), an NGO 
based in New York meant to provide technology advice to Tibetans across the globe, 
recommends against its use. Pema told me about a number of her friends who had to be careful 
not to mention or reference the Dalai Lama, whose image is illegal in China, with their family as 
it could lead to their prosecution within the state. This is a concern among many users, as they 
identify the primary use of WeChat as a way to connect with family. 
                                              
9 https://www.businessinsider.com/wechat-has-hit-1-billion-monthly-active-users-2018-3  
10 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/04/we-cant-chat-709-crackdown-discussions-blocked-on-weibo-and-wechat/ 
11 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/07/analyzing-censorship-of-the-death-of-liu-xiaobo-on-wechat-and-weibo/ 
12 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/cant-picture-this-an-analysis-of-image-filtering-on-wechat-moments/ 
13 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/how-wechat-filters-images-for-one-billion-users/ 
14 https://citizenlab.ca/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/  
15 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/11/managing-message-censorship-19th-national-communist-party-congress-wechat/ 
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 Tashi stated that, for him, WeChat was a “family thing,” primarily being used as an 
instant messaging service that connects family across distance, but also among closer relatives. 
He described the ubiquity of the app as an alternative to more common (in the West) SMS 
services. Questions like “how are you”, “how was your day”, and “dinner at 6” are among the 
things listed as messages commonly sent through the app. Indeed, WeChat is the primary method 
in which those in diaspora stay in contact with those still in China.  
 Some Tibetans question why a Chinese developed and monitored app would be used by 
Tibetans in such personal ways. Pema’s thoughts are interesting on this. In one of my interviews, 
she said: 
P: I don’t know. I’m kind of skeptical about it, because there’s a lot of tapping of 
communication. It’s controlled by the Chinese. They tap on almost everything and I 
really do not understand why Tibetans inside of Tibet would use that app. So, with me, I 
have asked my family to switch to What’s App even though I know that there is no such 
risk for ME, because I have no relatives, I have no families inside of Tibet. But I have a 
friend here. I won’t name her. She, her entire family is inside of Tibet. And then, she still, 
they still use WeChat to contact each other. She’ll call them, talk to them and I will be 
like “Why do you use that if you know that it has a very sensitive…uh… 
J: Surveillance? 
P: Yeah! 
 
Pema joins many Tibetans in criticizing the use of WeChat in their daily communications; 
however, she also notes that many Tibetans are reluctant to give up using the app as well. She 
continues shortly after the previous quote with: 
I use WeChat even now. My parents are still adamant. They wouldn’t switch to 
What’sApp. They are still using WeChat. I contact them through WeChat. My family, my 
relatives. But, with my younger generation, we would use messenger, Instagram, 
SnapChat. That would be more…but no even youngsters would use WeChat. 
 
Here she begins to hint that younger Tibetans would stray from WeChat, especially if their 
relatives inside Tibet were not using it. She stops herself, however, and reconsiders this position. 
This is when she told me that WeChat has become ubiquitous within the Tibetan community (in 
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multiple regions). Pema was born in India and is a part of a larger community reliant on WeChat 
for communication around the Tibetan Plateau. When I spoke with a younger Tibetan individual 
born and raised in the US and with minimal ties to the Tibetan homeland, Pasang, use of WeChat 
was rejected outright. She explained her reasoning: 
“for me personally, WeChat, it's too much of a risk. I know there are individuals who 
choose to use WeChat with self-censorship for the protection of those who they 
communicate with and that's, I definitely think it's okay. It's just not something that I 
personally do.” 
 
Pasang was concerned with issues of surveillance by the Chinese state and had been warned by 
specific Tibetan organizations, such as the Tibet Action Institute, to avoid communicating 
through WeChat with individuals who could come to harm.  
 Tashi also identified the concerns of his fellow Tibetans with regards to WeChat; 
however, he counters Pema and Pasang’s criticism of using the app. 
I am actually coming from the other side and saying we must use it. I think we 
must…most of them are used to sort of inform China and they are not at all willing to 
listen to us. So now through this kind of app, they are secretly listening to us and for me 
now we have this chance, we have the ear of the Chinese government. So we need to talk 
and we need to do as much as we can to spread His Holiness’s message to those inside of 
Tibet. Unless it is a threat to your family members. Which inside of Tibet, they can’t, but 
for us we can do that. 
 
Tashi’s argument demonstrates a form of agency on the part of Tibetan technology users. For 
him, he believes the importance lies in the discursive spaces these technologies create and 
therefore outweighs the surveillance and transnational hegemonic authority. I would not argue 
that these acts of resistance are counter-hegemonic, but I believe they demonstrate an interesting 
strategy for cultural preservation and unity in diaspora which is not as easily accomplished 
without said technologies. The concept of using social media and other technology in exercising 
agency is more thoroughly examined in Chapter 5. 
WhatsApp 
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 Participants identified WhatsApp as the second most popular application used in their 
daily lives. WhatsApp was founded in 2009 by two former Yahoo employees. It was designed as 
an instant messaging service before other services such as Messenger and WeChat were 
developed. In 2014, it became a subsidiary of Facebook. Along with Facebook and Instagram, 
the application is banned within China. Unlike other applications banned within the country, 
WhatsApp was not targeted due to use by activists or for the sharing of illegal content, but due to 
a tightening of Chinese cyber-security laws in 2017 (Mozur 2017).16 
 Interestingly, before this ban, WhatsApp added end-to-end encryption to all forms of 
messaging within their app (Metz 2016).17 What this means is that data is encrypted in a way that 
the only person who can read that data is the recipient. No third party, even hackers, conceivably, 
could access messages sent through the service. This coincided with a large news story within 
the United States following the San Bernardino terrorist attack. The FBI demanded that Apple 
unlock the iPhone belonging to one of the terrorists. Apple refused, arguing that this was a 
breach of privacy, and set off a debate regarding privacy in the digital era (Issa 2016).18 A 
federal judge ruled that Apple was not required to unlock the device and that ended the matter. 
 Left out of that conversation, however, were the ongoing developments to the 
surveillance state within China. The ethical issues being brought to the surface in the above case 
had long been reality in China by that time. Therefore, when WhatsApp introduced more secure 
encryption software, despite not having clear evidence of illegal use within the country, it was no 
longer possible for the application to fall under regulations of the state.  
                                              
16 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/technology/whatsapp-facebook-china-internet.html 
17 https://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-whatsapp-just-switched-encryption-billion-people/ 
18 https://www.wired.com/2016/02/forcing-apple-hack-iphone-sets-dangerous-precedent/  
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 Even with such security measures in place, WhatsApp users can still fall prey to Chinese 
authority. In 2018, Zhang Guanghong, a Chinese citizen, sent a message to a WhatsApp group 
consisting of individuals both outside and within China. The message was critical of Chinese 
president Xi Jinping. He was later detained within China and presented with printouts of the 
messages he sent (Mozur 2018).19 As explained, end-to-end encryption prevents any third party 
from accessing data; therefore, it is highly likely that Guanghong was reported by a user in the 
recipient groups.  
 I use this example to demonstrate not only the ways in which transnational hegemony is 
not limited by encrypted technology, but to example why Tibetans “switching” habitual use of 
technology from WeChat to WhatsApp would not necessarily benefit them in terms of avoiding 
surveillance. This is not a new phenomenon and evidences deeper concerns regarding peer 
surveillance and the panopticon as Foucault (1977) described it, which involves a system of 
power which encourages individuals (even those not affiliated with the state specifically) to bear. 
In the above example, Guanghong would not have been found out and arrested had WhatsApp 
truly been the panacea others hoped it would be. This is to be examined further in this thesis, but 
here we see an example of how entrenched such structures of power are and how difficult it is to 
subvert them.  
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube 
 Every individual uses different forms of media to the point where one’s use becomes as 
individually curated as their clothes or hobbies. Therefore, it is important to note that Tibetans in 
exile are not limited to the applications and websites I have chosen to specifically address. For 
example, much of the activism regarding the Tibetan community exists on Facebook and 
                                              
19 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/technology/china-technology-censorship-borders-expansion.html  
49 
 
Twitter, as those are the two primary forms of social media accessible across the globe. Groups 
such as “Free Tibet” and “Students for a Free Tibet”, the latter of which I primarily deal with in 
this thesis, have an active presence on both sites. Most of the audience of these sites are Western, 
with commenters primarily being non-Tibetan individuals who support Tibetan causes.  
 YouTube is particularly interesting for three very different reasons. First, on a larger 
scale, videos even tangentially related to Tibet will spark historical debate within the comments 
section of the respective video. This is most enlightening when one sees the dueling perspectives 
of both Chinese and Tibetan users20 play out online.  
 Secondly, YouTube, alongside Facebook and Twitter, provides Tibetan activist and 
cultural groups with a channel through which to disseminate information and news. Alongside 
the long running Tibetan Review, there are numerous ways in which Tibetans get their news on 
the exile community. My participants identified the website of the Central Tibetan 
Administration (CTA) as a primary source for news relating to Tibet. Most commonly, I was told 
that individuals would simply share articles directly from the website rather than sharing them 
from any one Facebook or Twitter page. No participant identified YouTube as a site they spend 
much time on. I find this curious. Channels such as TibetTV (the official media arm of the CTA), 
“RFATibet”, and “Voice of Tibet” boast large subscriber counts, but do not regularly reach over 
500 views per video. In short, my ethnographic participants did not identify YouTube as a source 
of news or community, but Tibetan engagement does occur.  
Third and finally, the site boasts a respectable number of channels devoted to Tibetan 
culture, primarily music. Tibetan use of music videos has already been the subject of analysis by 
                                              
20 I presume ethnicity based on username, language use, and community engagement. Obviously, such presumption 
is not guaranteed even if the person comments that they identify as a specific ethnicity. This is one of the pitfalls of 
digital research and requires judicious data collection. 
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Cameron David Warner (2013) who examined the subtle ways in which Tibetans used music 
videos to preserve and celebrate their own cultural practices under the nose of the Chinese 
censors. In part, my examination of Tibetan related content on YouTube is to update and expand 
on his examination in the context of a transnational techno/mediascape (Appadarai 1996).  
Digital Ethnolinguistics 
  Through my research, one common subject has been emphasized: the relationship 
between these digital technologies and Tibetan linguistic practices. Language is a large part of 
the ethnic and national identity of any group, but in the face of marginalization, diaspora, and, in 
some cases, policies bent on linguistic extermination, language revitalization becomes 
desperately important (Meek 2010). This undercurrent of linguistic anxiety permeates the 
Tibetan community both on and offline. In this section, I will elaborate on these anxieties within 
the Tibetan diasporic community, provide some scholarly context on language revitalization in 
marginalized communities, and conclude with an explanation as to how digital media 
technologies help in the revitalization process within the context of the Tibetan diaspora. 
Pema described her anxiety to me numerous times by repeating and emphasizing such 
phrases as “they [Tibetan elders and authority figures] place a lot of emphasis on Tibetan 
language.” She also complained of a disconnect between the Tibetan language as it is spoken and 
as it is written. She stated that “you cannot write what you say and that makes things difficult,” 
and continued “there is like a pressure for young people to speak pure Tibetan and not…not like 
broken Tibetan. I don’t speak pure Tibetan, no way. I am trying but I cannot.” She also noted 
how she was always self-conscious of her own language use, admitting that she would stay silent 
rather than contribute to conversations in spoken Tibetan. However, she also notes something 
very interesting as she continues: 
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If I were to go to a retreat center in India, I would be told to speak in Tibetan first. So I 
would have to watch my language. And I would not speak up as much as I [want] and say 
my thoughts and ideas because I cannot speak good Tibetan. At the retreat center [in New 
York], they made it very clear, you can use any language you want. We could even speak 
broken Tibetan. It was kind of inclusive that way. That’s why we discussed language. 
Because we felt that Tibetan language was sort of shifting, like we could create our own 
form of Tibetan. That was a whole other discussion, but you see how that is more 
impactful. 
  
 Pema demonstrates a few things of importance here. First, she notes the pressure younger 
Tibetans in diaspora, especially those in Western communities, feel to preserve an “authentic” 
Tibetan language. It is also interesting that my participants used terms such “pure” and “clean” to 
denote such language use, as compared to dialects of Tibetan which have grown to include Hindi 
or Chinese words, which would take on the antithesis of “dirty” or “broken” language. The 
second issue Pema points to here is the “shifting” nature of the Tibetan language and the freeing 
feeling she felt after being allowed to speak the language of her choice, even “broken” Tibetan.  
 Pasang bemoaned the use of such terms and called the view of a “pure Tibetan language” 
elitist. She described her thoughts as such: 
 
I would say that trying to preserve anything in stone, like stone is easily shattered. For 
example, like you want preservation to be malleable, you want it to be adaptable in order 
for it to actually succeed and be effective. 
 
Pasang mentioned that most Tibetans in exile (she said 95% even) would use the Hindi word 
aaloo, meaning “potato”, rather than the traditional Tibetan word for the vegetable. This may 
seem obvious, as most Tibetan refugees have been funneled through India and cannot help but 
diffuse some Hindi into their language patterns; however, this is exactly the point Pasang was 
trying to make in her example: if their language did not bend, it would break.  
 In her 2010 book We Are Our Language, Barbara Meek (2010) shows how endangered 
language communities bring life back into their heritage through revitalization practices. Of 
these, she mentions some key factors identified by UNESCO for language vitality. For my 
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purposes, I only examine a few as they relate to this thesis. They are (in my own order) as 
follows: 
- Amount and Quality of Documentation 
- Community Members’ Attitudes toward their Own Language 
- Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes and Policies Including Official 
Status and Use 
- Language Response to New Domains and Media 
 
The advent of digital archives has been a boon to the first factor, amount and quality of 
documentation. The Buddhist Digital Resource Center boasts over 15,000 high-quality scans of 
texts dating from Medieval Tibet to the late 20th century, preserving several texts important to 
Tibetan history and folklore. The “Mandala Project” out of the University of Virginia is another 
such digital repository of Tibetan, Bhutanese, Nepalese, and Indian cultural texts, with the added 
contribution of audio, video, and works of art. Certainly these technologies do well to preserve 
religious and cultural history, but what does it provide to the general Tibetan community?  
Pema did identify Tibetan religious history as an important concern with language. She 
told me: 
And then when you read Tibetan Buddhist scripture, it is written Tibetan language, so if 
you do not read as much Tibetan, then you do not really understand what is going on in 
the text as much, right? And if you do not understand, then you do not want to read it, 
you know? So…. Westerners are coming from all over to study Buddhism in India, but 
Tibetans are having a problem understanding Buddhism. That’s this huge problem and 
it’s because of mainly language. 
 
She identified language acquisition as a sort of key to accessing cultural knowledge (in this case 
religious) and joked that Westerners travel to learn Buddhism from Tibetans, but Tibetans 
themselves sometimes have trouble accessing such knowledge. When I pressed her on this 
subject with one of my follow-up questions regarding “obligation” to participate in such aspects 
of Tibetan culture, she told me: 
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I did feel obligated earlier. If felt like I was being told. It was more of my duty than 
desire to be able to speak with Tibetans, to be able to learn Buddhism, but now it’s more 
of a desire, coming out of a desire. Because you sort of look at it and you think, you sit 
down and think about it. But I can say that there are people struggling, like, to fit in that 
space. 
 
She references the difference between desire and duty identified by Tina Lauer (2015) in her 
examination of second-generation refugees in Switzerland, an article Pema has read.  
 This brings me to the second factor listed above: community members’ attitudes towards 
their own language. As might be evident from my above quotations, Tibetans note language as 
an important part of ethnic identity and cultural preservation. One should make the distinction 
between the two because, as Lauer (2015) specifically outlined, the demarcations of “Tibetan-
ness” is fluid, especially among younger respondents who are more likely to question the strict 
boundaries of their parents and become more open to individualistic endeavors. As noted by 
Barth (1969) ethnic boundary markers change over time as they are negotiated by members 
within the group. 
Returning to Pema, who is a veritable well-spring of data on this subject, she explained to 
me that elders within the Tibetan community will become “defensive” when she would question 
cultural practices. In addition, she stated that she was similarly criticized for watching Indian 
television shows and listening to foreign music. In her example, her use of language grew from a 
duty to which she was obligated to perform to an internalized desire to speak the language and 
revitalize it. Others might wish to abandon it due to a feeling of ambivalence and lack of 
perceived reward in learning it. Pasang scoffed at such traditionalist viewpoints. Humorously, 
she told a story of her time teaching in India. At her school, Tibetan women were required to 
wear chubas, which can get rather hot in the Indian climate. Pasang opted for a half chuba, one 
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that breathes better, and was scolded by a member of the CTA for choosing clothing not 
traditionally authentic. To which her thoughts were:  
Because we live in a different climate now. So we're in exile and in a different climate, so 
that is just much more appropriate. Unless you want female teachers passing out with 
dehydration and overheating. Like you need to be able to adapt culture as to where you 
are. And same thing in exile. 
 
These debates about rigidity or fluidity are fairly consistent in diasporic and indigenous 
communities dealing with language issues (Eisenlohr 2004; Cook 2004; Meek 2010). 
 Now, a complicating factor within this conversation is diasporic Tibetan concerns for 
language policy within Tibet. One of the most salient concerns of Tibetan publications in the past 
two years dealt with the imprisonment of language education activist Tashi Wangchuk. 
Wangchuk argued against policies to mandate Mandarin as the official language of schooling 
and advocated for the preservation of the Tibetan language within China. In 2015, Wangchuk 
and his cause was featured in a video produced by the New York Times and two months later, he 
was detained in China. In 2018, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment (starting when he 
was first detained in 2016) (Buckley 2018)21. It is actually against Chinese law to limit language 
use in ethnic minority community, but Wangchuk’s crimes still seem to fall beneath the larger 
umbrella of “separatist actions”.  
 Chinese internal policy consistently works to undermine religious and ethnic diversity. 
Specifically, religious activities in the western border regions of Tibet and Xinjiang are 
monitored closely. According to the Human Rights Watch organization, smaller social groupings 
are curbed through concerns of an “ideological threat” to the nation22. Specifically of interest 
here is the inclusion of a ban on children attending Tibetan religious services in their holiday 
                                              
21 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/world/asia/tibetan-activist-tashi-wangchuk-sentenced.html  
22 https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/30/illegal-organizations/chinas-crackdown-tibetan-social-groups  
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months. According to the Tibetan Review (2019)23, this prevents students from attending free 
language learning lessons from monks and adds another threat to the preservation of Tibetan 
linguistic practices.   
 This all works to make the landscape of Tibetan language revitalization difficult, but 
there are ways in which Tibetans practice individual agency to preserve it. This brings me to the 
final part of the important factors for language preservation: how language responds to new 
media.  All of my participants designated WeChat and mobile technologies as helpful to 
language revitalization. Tashi specifically outlined the importance of WeChat in this way: 
…we send texts in Tibetan script. Especially on Wednesday, we call it white Wednesday, 
which is specifically designated for the preservation of Tibetan culture. So on 
Wednesdays, all participants must use Tibetan all the time. There are issues with 
language. For example in Tibet, they sometimes come up with Chinese words and in 
India, it is Hindi and English. So the languages kind of mix. So we try to keep it clean 
and that won’t happen without things like WeChat. 
 
Again, note the use of “white” and “clean” to denote the rigid use of “pure” Tibetan language 
use. The “White Wednesday” (lhakar in Tibetan and more widely known as “The Lhakar 
Movement”) Tashi is referring to here is a part of a larger non-violent resistance movement 
specific to the Tibetan community. Lhakar is a movement dependent on individual participation 
in non-cooperative acts of discursive resistance. To better illustrate the nature of the movement, 
the “lhakar pledge” is as follows: 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will speak pure Tibetan in my family. 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will speak pure Tibetan whenever I meet a Tibetan. 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will remind myself every day that I am a Tibetan till I die. 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will wear only Tibetan traditional dress, chuba, every 
Wednesday. 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will speak only Tibetan every Wednesday. 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will learn Tibetan language. 
- I am Tibetan, from today I will stop eating meat and only eat a vegetarian diet and 
gain more merit every Wednesday. 
                                              
23 http://www.tibetanreview.net/china-criticized-for-banning-tibetan-children-from-learning-their-own-language/ 
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- I am Tibetan, from today I will only use Tibetan and speak Tibetan when I call or 
send a message to Tibetans24 
  
All of my participants noted WeChat as a technology that aids in the practice of lhakar. 
Numerous times, I was shown how to type in Tibetan script on mobile phone keyboard, itself a 
freeing technology for Tibetans. The ability to type in their own language is important and the 
Tibetan (as well as the related Dzongkha) keyboard is native to both Apple and Android 
products. This is helpful to the preservation of language when such conveniences are included in 
mobile technologies, but not all services include such access. 
Because of the marginal nature of the Tibetan language, digital tutorials and resources 
have been made available to troubleshoot and promote the use of Tibetan online. A particular site 
of interest is “Digital Tibetan”, which is devoted to keeping track of software in which it is 
possible to include the use of Tibetan. In Figure 3.1, you can see the “news ticker” in the right 
side of the page which identifies news related to software support for the language. In this case, 
the latest news is that a new version of Amazon’s Kindle stopped support for the Tibetan script. 
The same site links to other related sites which focus on other areas of Tibetan tech use, such as 
the Buddhist Digital Resource Center, which is a digital archive of Buddhist as well as cultural 
texts, with a focus on Tibetan culture. These sites serve an important function of helping to guide 
localization efforts and cyber activism within the Tibetan community by gathering tools and 
tutorials which bring the language firmly into the digital age. However, it has to be noted that 
these sites are written predominantly in English. 
The common use of English among the Tibetan community is a matter of convenience as 
well as strategy. Of course, individuals living in English speaking nations would find it necessary 
to learn the language, but there is a larger context to this. 
                                              
24 Retrieved from https://lhakardiaries.com/about/ February 5, 2019 
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Figure 3.1 
In the early days of internet technology (e.g. the 90s), the language of technology and the 
language of English were synonymous. In addition, the global ubiquity of the English language 
lent itself to the gathering of allies (whether that be nation-states or individually interested 
citizens) and the proliferation of the Tibetan cause worldwide.  
 Tibetans continue to rely on English as the primary language of public activism online. In 
this case, WeChat offers no respite where Tibetans can engage in public activism in either 
Tibetan or Chinese, as they would immediately be censored by the Chinese state for subversion. 
The Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto has conducted several studies on WeChat 
censorship specifically and has shown that both images and texts can be censored in very short 
order (as short as 5 seconds) after being uploaded (Ruan, Knockel, and Crete-Nishihata 201725; 
Crete-Nishihata et al. 201826; Knockel, Ruan, Crete-Nishihata, Deibert 201827; Kenyon 201828; 
                                              
25 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/04/we-cant-chat-709-crackdown-discussions-blocked-on-weibo-and-wechat/ 
26 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/07/analyzing-censorship-of-the-death-of-liu-xiaobo-on-wechat-and-weibo/ 
27 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/cant-picture-this-an-analysis-of-image-filtering-on-wechat-moments/ 
28 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/how-wechat-filters-images-for-one-billion-users/ 
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Ruan, Knockel, Ng, and Crete-Nishihata 201829; Ruan, Dalek, and Knockel 201930). Also, in my 
research on WeChat, I have found that no censorship occurs so long as the article referencing 
Tibet is supportive of the Chinese position. Figure 3.2 is a screenshot of the beginning of an 
article written by a Chinese user denouncing a Western animal food company The Honest 
Kitchen who advertise their food as containing no ingredients from China and support Tibetan 
independence.   
 
Figure 3.2 
 Therefore, Tibetan activists rely on Western social media to advertise their events, goals, 
and information. This leads to an interesting paradigm in which Tibetans are pulled in multiple 
different linguistic directions, while remaining tied to one’s “duty” to contribute to practices of 
lhakar and Tibetan cultural identity.  
YouTube As a National Media Platform 
 TibetTV, RFATibet, and VOATibet are all YouTube channels serving a similar function: 
they are all Tibetan news media cites. Specifically, TibetTV is the official media arm of the 
                                              
29 https://citizenlab.ca/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/  
30 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/11/managing-message-censorship-19th-national-communist-party-congress-wechat/ 
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Tibetan government-in-exile (CTA). These channels receive very little community engagement. 
Their statistics generally hover around 80 views per video even weeks after being uploaded. 
Given that the estimated population of Tibetans outside of China is roughly 130,000 as of 
201531, this does not seem to me to be particularly cogent in understanding how Tibetans use 
technology. This would make some amount of sense if you think that Tibetans born in diaspora 
would not necessarily concern themselves with a land they have never been to, but, in my 
experience, diasporic Tibetan youth are very concerned with the larger community and the 
political economy of Tibet. This makes me conclude that they simply get their news elsewhere, 
for example through the Tibetan Review which has a website and social media presence. Similar 
trends are noted in RFATibet and VOATibet. Compare this to the channels dealing specifically 
with music and it is a different story.  
 I examined three YouTube channels with significant subscriber counts which specifically 
focused on the publication of Tibetan music videos. My thoughts leading to this examination 
were spurred by Cameron David Warner’s (2013) article on what he called “uncivil religion” in 
Tibetan music videos. He argued that the use of subtle religious, linguistic, and cultural motifs 
demonstrated a form of resistance to Chinese hegemony in favor of a uniquely Tibetan art form. 
I was curious to see if this was important to the diaspora community, as the previous study dealt 
with Tibetans within China.  
 I analyzed the ten most recent videos from three of the largest channels I could find on 
YouTube (their names and data in the table below). I chose to analyze based on upload date 
rather than the most popular (judged by YouTube) because I felt this would provide a more up-
                                              
31 Data available at http://tibetdata.org/projects/population/. The author admits that this report is by no means 
authoritative, as the CTA (and the nature of diaspora itself) does not efficiently track demographics.  
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to-date image of the video trends.32 For each video, I coded for images (unique shots) which 
demonstrated33: landscape, specifically when the landscape or architecture is the main focus of 
the shot; religious iconography or the use of thangka34 paintings, which are both of religious and 
cultural importance to Tibetan culture; and ritual or cultural practice. That last category is broad, 
so, for the purpose of my analysis, I limited it to shots which demonstrated a clear purpose in 
highlighting cultural activities specific to Tibet. I chose these categories based on the analysis of 
resistance found in Warner’s (2013) article. Each time I encountered a unique shot containing the 
coded material, I would mark it down and would stop at ten, given that this number would 
indicate a large portion of the video was devoted to the theme.  
Name Subscriber Count Upload Count Most Hits 
Kenze85 18,865 362 1,100,000 
Tibetan HeartBeat 6,762 944 137,000 
Tibetan Music 
World 
20,653 1,358 746,139 
Figure 3.3 
                                              
32 I can be rightfully criticized for this, as the most popular videos might demonstrate what is clearly of more 
importance, but I was uncomfortable with two aspects of this. First, the amount of time since the upload would have 
varied and allowed for a trickle of views that distance them from other more recent videos. Second, disregarding 
upload date would not tell me anything about habitual use, as my chosen method might. 
33 Coding list: Landscape; iconography; ritual; religious; cultural practice (specific to Tibet). 
34 Thangka paintings are traditional works of Tibetan art usually depicting Buddhist religious figures or events on 
cotton or silk.  
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Figure 3.4 
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1
6
4
6
10 10
6
2
10
1
1
1
7
1
V I D E O  
1
V I D E O  
2
V I D E O  
3
V I D E O  
4
V I D E O  
5
V I D E O  
6
V I D E O  
7
V I D E O  
8
V I D E O  
9
V I D E O  
1 0
KENZE85 VIDEO THEMES
Landscape Iconograph / thangka Ritual/Cultural Practice
6
4 5 3
10 10 10
2 2
8
1
1
10
10
10
6
3
5
2
V I D E O  
1
V I D E O  
2
V I D E O  
3
V I D E O  
4
V I D E O  
5
V I D E O  
6
V I D E O  
7
V I D E O  
8
V I D E O  
9
V I D E O  
1 0
TIBETAN HEARTBEAT VIDEO THEMES
Landscape Iconograph / thangka Ritual/Cultural Practice
62 
 
 
Figure 3.6 
 Overwhelmingly, the landscape motif made up the largest part of the coded data, 
followed by ritual or cultural practices such as spinning prayer wheels and circumambulation 
around stupas and prayer flags. As might be expected from a cultural group dealing with land 
dispossession, the vast majority of these videos involved the singer in a secluded or isolated 
dramatic landscape which illustrates the Tibetan sense of love for the landscape and, by 
extension, their homeland in which they now may feel disassociated from, like guests in their 
own home. Warner described these videos as containing imagery that hearkened back to a “pure” 
Tibet of the past, one which was free from Chinese influence. This was demonstrated a number 
of times when shots specifically featured monks, the Potala Palace in Lhasa, or children in rural 
villages. Very rarely was a “modern” Tibet the focus. Technology and modern architecture are 
notably not in focus in these videos. One video35 by Norbu Samdup (entitled “Nangla Logdro”), 
though not included in the above sample, requires specific attention. 
                                              
35 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Td0VvUIPuE  
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 In this video, the singer wakes in an apartment within a city. From there, the video shows 
the singer leaving an airport on foot, surrounded by individuals in modern clothing. Briefly, the 
video shows a time lapse of the Potala Palace at night while cars zoom past on the street below. 
For the remainder of the video, the singer travels through rural Tibet, performing for groups 
wearing traditional chubas and blessing him with khatas, which are ceremonial scarves 
indicative of Tibetan Buddhism. The video continues with the singer traveling on foot in 
secluded mountain terrain. He places the khata on a rock stupa, ending his visual pilgrimage. He 
returns to the city in which the video began the video ends with an image of the man sleeping. 
Was it a dream? Is he resting contentedly after his pilgrimage and connection with the 
landscape?  
 What is specifically important about this video is, of course, the connection to the 
landscape as a metaphor of indigenous pride and identity, but also the purity of rural Tibet and 
Buddhism. The juxtaposition of modernity and the past is notable in both the shot of the Potala 
and the singer’s happiness upon returning from his pilgrimage to the countryside. These videos 
demonstrate that the visual themes in Warner’s argument are alive and well, but do they matter 
much to those outside of Tibet? 
 In short, no. None of my participants identified YouTube as a site on which they spent 
much time. When I specifically probed for information on YouTube, I usually only received 
blank stares. Only Pasang mentioned music and, specifically, a 2017 song called “Phur”36, which 
she said was interesting as a song that was released by a Tibetan artist from Tibet and became a 
hit with those in diaspora. Indeed, it is a very popular song within the diasporic community, as it 
often appears in Tibetan memes like the ones in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. She did not indicate that this 
                                              
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xRGTQaCbbnw 
64 
 
was a common occurrence of any particular importance. Tibetans living outside of the Chinese 
state are not necessarily inclined to search out specifically Tibetan music for either cultural 
reinforcement or for a connection to a homeland.  
 
Figure 3.7 
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Figure 3.8 
 However, this does not make me discount the importance of YouTube to diasporic 
communities. Several activist campaigns are launched and advertised on YouTube, though not 
primarily. News is circulated through YouTube videos as well as through Twitter and Facebook. 
What I argue that sites like YouTube and Instagram provide to the Tibetan community in 
diaspora is the access to cultural artifacts (such as art and music) that might otherwise be 
inaccessible. These sites allow for global flows of art and music which form a larger media-scape 
(Appadarai 1996) in which Tibetans in multiple countries may consume and distribute 
experiences, knowledge, and creativity. 
Does the Technology Really “Connect”? 
  So far, I have focused on policies and practices of engagement within the Tibetan 
diaspora in a way that focuses on either “inside” or “outside” of Tibet, which, in my defense, is 
very often how diasporic Tibetans themselves organize and discuss matters of community. 
However, one of the questions I sought to answer through this research is how digital 
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technologies connect Tibetans in diaspora and to what extent this is an important phenomenon 
for such communities. That, in detail, is another chapter in this thesis, but from here I will 
conclude with some thought on the capabilities and implications of connecting technologies such 
as the ones dealt with above writ large.  
 First examined by Goldsmith and Wu (2006) and reaffirmed by Zuckerman (2013) and 
(Srinivasan 2017), geography continues to matter in the digital age. Regional access to internet 
technologies is unequal and stratified, bringing into question the vision of the “flat world”, 
proposed by Friedman (2005) as one in which geographical divisions become irrelevant in the 
globalized world. Rather, globalization’s inequalities prevent such even footing. For example, 
Zuckerman (2013) specifically critiques what he refers to as “digital cosmopolitanism”, or the 
idea that technology connects and allows us to interact ubiquitously with any part of the world at 
any time. While he concedes that new digital technologies such as social media do connect the 
world in novel ways, they do little to genuinely connect world populations. In one of his book’s 
more powerful examples, he cites a project he completed in 2003 in which he wrote an algorithm 
that identified news stories by what country they covered. He found that similar patterns 
emerged in which the entire state of Africa was largely ignored (80).  
 Couple this with the “media bubble” most social media users confine themselves to. 
Zuckerman (2013) actually argued that news becomes curated based on who we know, so what 
we know is dictated by our social groups. Even before the founding of sites like Facebook, states 
like China were developing tight restrictions on internet traffic transnationally. The “Great 
Firewall” is one such example of a state influencing the ways in which technology may behave 
transnationally. In other words, the “flat world” is certainly untrue even in the digital sense.  
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 Interestingly, in the case of Tibetans living in diaspora, when I asked if digital 
technologies made them feel at all more connected to the diasporic community, they said no. 
They were quick to identify technologies such as WeChat as important to the maintenance of 
social connections (family, friends, etc.) and linguistic practices, but were hesitant to say that 
these technologies made them feel anymore connected to the community on a larger scale. For 
my participants, physical meetings meant far more than what digital technology could offer.  
Therefore, if we are to understand “connection” as a form of linking through mediated 
communication, then, yes, applications like WeChat and Facebook are a positive tool for the 
Tibetan community. However, if we use the term “connect” to imply that digital technologies 
allow for some deeper sense of community among Tibetans in diaspora, then my participants 
would disagree. Instead, it is vital that we heed Victoria Bernal’s (2014) argument to consider 
the nation as “networks” in which connections are made and maintained through mediated 
technology. As Bernal argues, the internet does not create the transnational political field, but 
transformed it (49). In essence, I must treat the answer to this section’s question in a necessarily 
contradictory fashion. That is to say, the answer is both “yes” and “no”. This subject is to be 
covered further in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Geopolitical Contexts and Transnational Hegemony 
 
Big Brother Goes Global 
 
  “Big Brother is Watching You” is something that has been repeated in common usage 
for so long, some might not even know where it originated, but 1984 by George Orwell haunts 
me now more than it has ever before. In 2017, Wired magazine published an article outlining the 
controversial Chinese “social credit system” to be rolled out between the time of publishing and 
2020, when it would become mandatory for citizens to participate (Botsman 2017).37 The article 
was entitled “Big data meets Big Brother” and what a troubling title it was. This system is built 
off of the collection of user data from various digital media applications which is then to be used 
to assign the user a “good citizen score” dependent on their activities. Coupled with China’s 
already vast and growing surveillance state, this could mean individuals would be denied travel 
tickets, loans, or even jobs based on their score. This is a troubling development for internet 
freedom in China, which was already troubled (Goldsmith and Wu 2006; Roberts 2018). 
 Except it was already a problem transnationally. 
 Digital surveillance is not a new phenomenon and it is not isolated to China. Edward 
Snowden’s revelations regarding surveillance on US citizens and the numerous reports by 
CitizenLab at the University of Toronto demonstrate the widespread, global use of such methods. 
Google and Facebook have been consistently criticized in both the media and government bodies 
for their misuse of user data, data breaches, discriminatory algorithms, and dissemination of 
dangerous false information. What these journalists, and even some scholars, have been slow to 
                                              
37 https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion 
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critique is the ways in which state entities were influencing not just their citizens, but other 
groups transnationally through such digital mediums. 
 This chapter demonstrates some of those instances. I examine how the specter of 
Orwell’s “Big Brother” affects populations of Tibetans in the US transnationally and how we can 
understand these processes through already established theoretical frameworks.  
 Before beginning this research, I was forewarned by other researchers that I might find 
some resistance in participants to talk about online activities due to a prevalent fear among 
ethnic-Tibetans that loved ones in China will be threatened. In fact, several individuals did reject 
my invitations to participate specifically for this reason. The individuals most willing to 
participate in my research were those who had no familial connections within China. When I 
presented my informed consent document to my participants, I always tried to explain in further 
detail the risks that were possible in participating. One man, a business owner I have here named 
Tashi, impatiently waved me away saying “I don’t care about any of that. It doesn’t apply to 
me.” Another individual, a university student here referred to as Pema, told me that it was good I 
put that in there “because some Tibetans will be afraid for that.”  
 To readers unfamiliar with the contentious subject of Tibetan sovereignty and Chinese 
policy, these fears may sound paranoid. One might even laugh when I say that I too felt anxious 
when broaching the subject around Chinese individuals, as I did when I lectured on my research 
for an undergraduate course which contained three Chinese international students and again 
when I was beginning to know a colleague recently. However, that feeling is the result of 
Foucault’s (1977) “panopticism” and “transnational governmentality” (Gupta and Ferguson 
2002; Schiller 2005). It is a situation of power at play that benefits only the hegemonic authority 
that spawns it when we censor ourselves in fear of it.  
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Most Tibetans living in the US are keenly aware of this, as evidenced humorously by 
Tashi when I told him about such concerns. “You are too careful,” Tashi said. “You are a free 
American, but you are not free. Your mind is under Chinese control. And it is not because of 
China, but because you are surrendering some of your own freedom.” In this way, he succinctly 
summarized the concept of governmentality, which Foucault (1991) envisioned as the art of 
government to produce and reproduce the ideal citizen in the eyes of the state, and hegemony as 
systems which has become transnational. Less humorously, he followed this up with “You know, 
these reasons are why we left Tibet, you know strong restrictions, no freedom, which is not how 
it is supposed to be here.” Before this, I had not thought of how frustrating it must be to escape 
an imperial power only to have its shadow follow you across the world.  
 Technology affects both human agency and hegemonic power. To understand both 
processes better, I examine more traditional forms of hegemony, such as fear, first and expand on 
the specific ways actors express their own agency through technology after.  
Panopticism and Transnational Governmentality 
 Foucault (1977) described his conception of ‘discipline’ and the panopticon as an all-
encompassing and self-operating “situation of power of which [subjects] are themselves the 
bearers,” (201). This system of surveillance and hegemonic control is most effective when it can 
exist outside of direct interference from a state authority. In other words, individuals propagate 
the panopticon through their own self-censorship and subsequent surveillance of their peers. In 
addition, Foucault notes that panopticism need not be directly attached to a state apparatus 
(though it often is) and is not necessarily bounded within the confines of a nation-state. Rather, 
this system of power and authority infiltrates and connects other institutions (such as non-state 
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actors) in order to extend “power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an 
infinitesimal distribution of the power relations,” (ibid, 216).  
 This concept has been demonstrated through the examples I note below. I removed issues 
of Tibetan history and culture from my class syllabus due to outside pressure. I stayed silent 
during the controversy of the Taiwanese flag in a parade. No direct state intervention prevented 
me from doing these things, rather, I willingly obliged for one reason or another. The advertisers 
who were wary of funding an obscure soccer event with a Tibetan team in England also 
demonstrate this concept. 
 The fear and apprehension to discuss Tibetan topics to which my participants referred is 
an example of such situations of power becoming embodied and replicated endlessly. Tashi’s 
criticism of Americans who are “too careful” around the subject of Tibet or China is poignant, 
arguing that one is not really free if one’s mind is controlled to an extent by China. Whether he 
meant to or not, he directly identified the heart of the concept of the panopticon, a prison in 
which we ourselves become jailors.  
 A central tenant of panopticism is surveillance. This can be in the form of state 
surveillance or the surveillance of one’s peers who maintain the possibility of reporting one’s 
actions. In the digital, an individual is literally never certain when surveillance is occurring. 
Therefore, users of services such as Facebook, Twitter, or WeChat must assume that surveillance 
is constant and therefore the situation of power is propagated once again, perhaps even more 
effectively, in a digital environment.  
 The panopticon forms a part of Foucault’s larger analysis of the myriad ways in which 
states govern populations and conduct, what he termed “governmentality” (1991). Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002) extend Foucault’s analysis from a state-centered framework to one that moves 
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beyond the vertical encompassment of the sovereign power to the local. They examine the ways 
in which hegemonic authority is produced and embodied abroad. Certainly, this involves 
numerous direct dealings with state authorities and geopolitics; however, Ferguson and Gupta 
(2002) place their concept of “transnational governmentality” as a part of the neoliberal global 
setting and stress that processes of governmentality have been transferred to transnational, non-
state entities (989). For example, NGOs and non-state entities such as the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the WTO have made policy decisions directly privileging “first world” nations over the 
developing world (Escobar 1995). Therefore, how might other transnational organizations, such 
as digital media entities, play a role in transnational governmentality? 
 Ramesh Srinivasan takes on this topic in his book Whose Global Village (2017), where 
he critiques the digital divide which prevents a majority of the world population from having any 
say in the applications or development of digital technologies. The global village is a metaphor 
for the globalized and transnational world made possible by technology. Technology such as the 
internet is viewed as a great, utopic connector, providing agency to those who may otherwise be 
denied in the wake of overwhelming hegemonic authority. Undoubtedly, this possibility is there 
and I will discuss it elsewhere, but here it is more interesting to discuss how developments in 
digital technology disenfranchise rather than connect. The question of “whose global village” 
precisely is it becomes very important to understandings of transnational governmentality and 
hegemony.  
Imperial Power and Transnational Social Fields 
 My theoretical groundings to this point have dealt largely with the nation-state as a 
central unit of analysis. This is rightly criticized by Nina Glick Schiller’s large body of work 
arguing against the use of such a strategy, which she terms “methodological nationalism”, in 
73 
 
transnational studies (see Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Her criticism of this approach to 
transnational studies led her to propose the concept of the “transnational social field”, borrowing 
from Bourdieu’s concept of the ways in which social relationships are structured by power 
(Schiller and Fouron 1999; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Schiller 2005).  
 Transnational social fields free scholars from a limited analysis provided by thinking of 
communities as bounded by states, nations, or even ethnicity. These boundaries are fluid and 
they become even more complex through global media and technoscapes. However, the concept 
does not negate the previous examination of power and panopticism as examined above; rather, 
it reinforces the issue of transnational governmentality and surveillance. Schiller (2005) notes 
that examinations of globalization tend to 1) treat all nation-state entities as if they were equal 
across the global terrain and 2) obscure the influences of imperialism. Instead, she argues that it 
is more efficient to examine various imperialisms (not just Western powers) and the political-
economic structures of power that serve specific states transnationally.  
Living in the Shadow of Big Brother 
 There is a pervasive fear among many Tibetan-identifying individuals when discussing 
Sino-Tibetan politics. Some, like Tashi, argue that one should not be controlled by such fear and 
that there is a duty or responsibility that necessitates their active participation in politics. This is 
something that has already been documented by Lauer (2015) in her study on second generation 
Tibetan refugees. Tashi described his duty as such:  
Part of our ethnicity demands responsibility. So you know we try to uh…you know I 
won’t be so active if I am from an independent nation, but being from Tibet with what is 
going on inside Tibet, you know intentional systemic destruction of cultural, religious, 
everything, language. So you know this gives a strong responsibility to preserve and 
represent Tibetan on every platform. Tibetan culture, traditionally language. And you 
know just assisting or helping personally anyone with interest in Tibet. It is like, you 
know, you represent Tibet and therefore you need to help preserve the culture, tradition, 
language. 
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This was one of the most important things Tashi has said to me and I will return to it 
several times, but what is interesting here is what makes him so comfortable in saying this. 
Recall that he waved away my information on risks and informed consent, saying “that does not 
apply to me.” He flatly rejects the perspective that transnational hegemony should affect such 
behavior; however, he is aware of the pervasive risk and fear of such power. 
 I asked him if he ever felt suspicious or had ever encountered issues of censorship or 
coercion when engaging with other Tibetans online (or physically for that matter). He told me 
that he is sometimes suspicious when WeChat “doesn’t seem to work properly,” such as when a 
picture refuses to send or a message is never received. While he was not overly concerned with 
what was more than likely minor glitches, the fact that the application is developed and 
monitored by the Chinese state and the implications therein make him wary. He is not without 
cause to be concerned on this subject, however. CitizenLab, a research laboratory based out of 
the University of Toronto, conducted several studies of WeChat (a Chinese government 
surveilled social media app and the most popular social media platform among Chinese citizens) 
and found that numerous texts and images were censored if they fit categories deemed 
“subversive” by the Chinese state (2017a38, 2017b39, 2017c40, 2018a41, 2018b42).  
 The same subconscious hesitance to which Tashi referred is repeated in other stories told 
by Tibetans. For example, Pema, a 22-year old university student living in the US, told me about 
a presentation she gave to fellow university students alongside her friend and fellow Tibetan. She 
stressed to me that the presentation did not deal with the political side of the Tibetan issue, but 
                                              
38 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/04/we-cant-chat-709-crackdown-discussions-blocked-on-weibo-and-wechat/ 
39 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/07/analyzing-censorship-of-the-death-of-liu-xiaobo-on-wechat-and-weibo/ 
40 https://citizenlab.ca/2017/11/managing-message-censorship-19th-national-communist-party-congress-wechat/ 
41 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/cant-picture-this-an-analysis-of-image-filtering-on-wechat-moments/ 
42 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/how-wechat-filters-images-for-one-billion-users/ 
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rather issues of environment and education inside of Tibet (despite these being intricately linked 
to politics regardless). Her description of the event follows: 
We opened the floor to Q&A, so one of the girls asked about political activism inside of 
Tibet. And then, uh, my friend, uh, whose family are inside of Tibet, had the microphone, 
the mic in her hand, and she looked at me and I saw that tension in her eyes. She was like 
“should I go or should I not?” There was this fear. Because there was no way…there was 
maybe one guy who immigrated from Hong Kong and there was one girl who later came 
to us saying that she was Chinese but she was born in the US, raised in the US, she was 
adopted by an American parent. She was sad to know about this. Other than that there 
were no Chinese elements and still there was that fear in her face…Tibetans inside Tibet 
cannot act as openly as we can. Because we…it’s very…risky for them to do that. Not 
just for them but their family too. 
 
Pema stressed two things when recounting this story. The first was that her presentation 
did not involve the contentious issue of Tibetan sovereignty or independence from China and 
that, therefore, there should have been no danger. In addition to this, she was clear to note only 
two plausibly Chinese individuals in the audience (something she could not have been certain of 
until after the presentation when she learned of the audience members). Again, this would seem 
to pose no threat. The second was the hesitance and fear to talk about the act of protests and self-
immolations within Tibet.  
When she says, “there were no Chinese elements”, Pema is referring to a lack of physical 
Chinese presence or authority. However, the wariness of such hegemonic authority being 
omnipresent even transnationally is the highlight of this story. Pema’s conclusion was that this 
fear is to be attributed to the connection of her friend’s family to the Chinese state and her worry 
that her family members will be negatively affected by her actions. I cannot conclude that this is 
anything but intentional and is a transnational extension of governmentality and “panopticism”, 
as described by Foucault (1977), that make any matter involving Tibet necessarily political and 
off-limits according to the Chinese state.  
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This concept extends into the digital as well. In fact, I argue that it becomes easier for 
Chinese state hegemonic authority to become transnational. Pema’s example shows how it can 
become so through traditional means of panopticism, where the fear of being reported and the 
threat of punishment bestowed upon one’s family molds behavior across state boundaries. The 
following shows how digital technologies can be even more effective in such processes. 
When Pema lived in India, she recalls taking part in a yearly protest organized by 
Students for a Free Tibet (and organization headquartered in Dharamsala, India, but with 
chapters in countries all around the world) marking the anniversary of the March 10th, 1959 
Tibetan Uprising. Pema notes that the protests took place in India and participants consented to 
group photographs while taking place in a blatant act of political dissent. However, she 
remembers that some of her friends asked the organization to take down their photographs from 
the corresponding Facebook page because “it was too risky for them to be holding the Tibetan 
flag.” This is interesting as it shows a difference in levels of comfort with one’s image being 
connected to a tangible photograph versus a digital artifact anyone can access. 
This phenomenon is well substantiated by numerous accounts that have been shared with 
me as well as online and in the literature. The image of the Dalai Lama, the cornerstone of 
Tibetan religious and cultural identity, is forbidden in any from within Chinese controlled 
territories and mobile applications. Every participant noted some form of concern when it came 
to sharing an image of either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan flag in digital environments. Pema’s 
friend was criticized by his parents for contacting them on WeChat when his profile picture was 
the 14th Dalai Lama. Tashi noted that those living in the West must be careful about such images, 
lest they implicate their family members in some way. Activists and other individuals practice 
agency and resistance in numerous ways, which will be examined elsewhere. 
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Control 
 These ethnographic examples serve to evidence the fear and hesitance Tibetan 
individuals and their allies can demonstrate due to transnational hegemony and governmentality. 
Now I will turn to concrete examples of Chinese state influence in transnational political 
examples. The example of Roy Jones (Ma 2018) is a good one, but I have expanded on that in 
the introduction.  
 Chinese authorities also often attempt to discredit or demonize the Dalai Lama on the 
international stage. This is a formidable challenge given that he has been a popular figure in the 
world since his exile. Historically speaking, the Dalai Lama has served as the face of the Tibetan 
independence movement until he stepped down from the Central Tibet Administration (CTA) in 
2011 and no longer advocates for wholesale Tibetan independence. However, as a pillar of 
Tibetan religious and ethnic identity, he is still viewed negatively as a separatist by Chinese 
authorities. 
 This negative evaluation often demonstrates itself with the Dalai Lama comes into any 
form of contact with foreign politicians or celebrities. In the case of celebrities, such as Lady 
Gaga who met with him in 2016, they are simply banned from the country (Phillips 2016).43 
Foreign dignitaries or politicians, however, risk much more when meeting with the man. In 2016, 
the state threatened “countermeasures” against France when the Dalai Lama spoke before the EU 
Parliament (Wong 2016).44 In 2017, the state issued a warning that meeting with the Dalai Lama 
was a “major offence” and would bear consequences (The Times of India 2017).45 In 2018, 
                                              
43 https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/jun/28/china-lady-gaga-ban-list-hostile-foreign-forces-meeting-dalai-
lama  
44 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-eu-dalailama/china-threatens-countermeasures-after-dalai-lama-speaks-
at-eu-parliament-idUSKCN11P0V9  
45 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/meeting-dalai-lama-major-offence-china-warns-world-
leaders/articleshow/61161639.cms  
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during a visit to the US, a group of Chinese delegates from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 
(TAR), who are ethnically Han, the majority ethnicity, warned American diplomats to refrain 
from any contact with the Dalai Lama (Leng and Delaney 2018).46  
 Annually, China seems to send a reminder to the world that engaging with the subject of 
the Dalai Lama or Tibet is a recipe for disaster politically and economically, as China’s 
economic success has continued to grow over the past decade and now maintains much more 
economic capital and cache than it had in the previous century. As another recent article by 
Wayne Ma (2018b) put it, “if you want to do business in China,” –and many, many do—“mind 
your T’s: Tibet and Taiwan.”47 48 
These threats affect more than companies trying to be successful in Chinese markets. In 
my own experience and pedagogy, I use the issue of Tibet as a teaching tool and discuss it often. 
In 2016, I led a “Chinese Book Club” for a professor that was designed as an alternative to the 
final project for an intercultural communication course. The goal of the course was to better 
understand Chinese culture as a whole through a selection of readings. Tibetans being one of the 
recognized minority ethnicities within China, I felt it was a worthwhile topic. The Chinese 
students I recruited to discuss the topic with Western students did not agree and, though they 
were happy to participate in other sessions of the course, they would not participate in 
discussions involving Tibet or Taiwan. Without Chinese students to share their emic 
                                              
46 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2146397/chinese-delegation-visiting-us-officials-
warns-about  
47 https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-you-want-to-do-business-in-china-mind-your-ts-taiwan-and-tibet-1527937201  
48This means it behooves multi-national corporations to hire individuals well versed in certain cultures in order to be 
sensitive to their cultural values as well as their cyber-policies for advertising. This is an important note to confront 
here because anthropologists would be precisely suited for such a position. At least in the case of China, it would 
beg the question of if fulfilling such a position that requires one to further marginalize certain cultures for the sake 
of company profit does not fulfill the same role as the earlier anthropologist in service of the imperial apparatus 
(Asad 1973).  
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perspectives, the course would lose its value for what it was designed to do and I therefore was 
forced to discard the material.49 
In the same year, I also served as a member of the Ball State International Ambassador’s 
Association. Each year, the students and the Rinker International Center organize several events 
showcasing the various world cultures from which the international student body hails. For one 
such event, a banner was being crafted by students comprised of the flags of several nation-
states. One of the flags included was Taiwan’s and led several Chinese students to complaining 
about its inclusion, while one of our Taiwanese students, Yùwén remained silent, having been 
the one to provide the flag. It was decided that the Taiwanese flag be removed to appease the 
Chinese students, who outnumbered the other group members by a good margin.50 I did not then 
ask Yùwén how she felt about this, but I was struck by—and continue to be reflective on—what 
it would mean to be denied the opportunity to proclaim your nationality in a community which 
was designed to make international students feel included and respected. 
Outside of the US, other situations show the same pattern. In October 2018, NPR 
reported on an obscure soccer tournament in London, which focused on an interesting concept of 
a model World Cup consisting of various minority peoples, including displaced populations such 
as Tibet. Specifically, the article recalls some of the examples I have noted above such as 
Marriot, when the author writes: “The Chinese government has been so effective at intimidating 
Western businesses on this front that sometimes companies do the [CPC’s] work for it (Langitt 
                                              
49 I should note here, for critical readers, that I was not a professor, nor even a graduate student, and therefore had 
much less authority and clout within my role as instructor than others might have.  
50 Similar incidents have been reported at universities in South Korea (http://www.tibetanreview.net/korean-
university-forced-to-apologize-to-china-over-separate-tibet-booth-at-intl-student-festival/), England 
(http://www.tibetanreview.net/university-in-england-bans-tibetan-flag-after-chinese-student-threatened-to-inform-
embassy/), as well as elsewhere in the US at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
(http://www.tibetanreview.net/united-states-university-bans-tibetan-flag-from-parade-of-nations-event/). It is noted 
that these sources come from a Tibetan site that acts as a sort of watchdog and specialized news source for Tibetans 
in exile and will be discussed later.  
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2018).51 In this example, advertisers seeking to sponsor the tournament requested the Tibetan 
team be removed before they agreed to participate. The organizers, to their credit, refused, but it 
demonstrates that even in seemingly small and inconsequential situations, companies and 
organizations fear the reaction of the ever-watchful Chinese state.  
 Another way in which the CCP and the Chinese state attempt to influence global 
perspectives is through the use of “soft power”. I will examine that concept more thoroughly 
below, but this is emphatically the goal of the CCP according to Xi Jinping in 2014, when he 
argued in a state address that “We should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese 
narrative, and better communicate China's message to the world,” (Miller 2014). One of the more 
prominent mean through which China accomplishes this goal is through state funded 
international cultural outreach centers spread throughout the world called Confucius Institutes. 
Confucious Institutes are Chinese government funded and operated attachments to foreign 
universities and cultural centers with the goal of educating the world in Chinese language and 
culture and, as of now, there are over 500 spread across 140 countries.  
These institutes were the subject of examination by Brazys and Dukalskis (2019), who 
proposed that the purpose of such initiatives is that of “grass roots image management”, which 
they explain is the process by which a hegemonic power attempts to influence perspectives of 
domestic populations with the hope that it “bubbles up” to political elites and thereby improves 
the rising power’s image and favor in global geopolitics. Their methods involved using data from 
the Global Database of Language, Events and Tone (GDELT) to perform a geospatial analysis of 
the tone of media reports involving China in regions within a locality housing a Confucius 
                                              
51 https://www.npr.org/2018/10/03/636299830/how-the-chinese-government-works-to-censor-debate-in-western-
democracies  
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Institute. They found that proximity to an institute improved the positive tone in media reports by 
6% post-founding.  
That, in and of itself, does not form the basis of much concern. As an anthropologist, why 
would I argue against the cultural exchange and understanding these institutes might provide? 
My concern lies in one of the criticisms that has repeatedly been lodged against them: that they 
are propaganda arms of the Chinese state and come with political strings attached such as the 
wholesale ban of discussing topics such as Taiwan and Tibet and curriculums under the control 
of the Chinese government (Editorial Board of The Guardian 2014).52  
Digital Giants 
 As I have argued, the distinction between physical and digital processes is unimportant, 
as one could argue that one is just an extension or a permeation of the other; however, I do want 
to highlight the ways in which technologies can make issues of fear and control more 
concerning. One such example is that of China and Internet technology giant Google.  
 For this, some brief context is necessary. Chinese internal policy dictates state censorship 
of various media content. Specifically, search results are censored to remove information the 
state deems “sensitive” or harmful to the “unity” of China (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Lei 
2017; Roberts 2018). As mentioned above, images of contentious Chinese figures, such as 
activists, are banned from being displayed or listed on webpages or search results. Among these 
figures are the Dalai Lama and Liu Xiaobo, an activist critical of the CCP. This latter example 
specifically is of interest. After being imprisoned for his political activities, Xiaobo was given 
medical parole and subsequently died in June 2017. Following his death, any text, image, or data 
                                              
52 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-confucius-institutes/2014/06/21/4d7598f2-f7b6-11e3-
a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html?utm_term=.1c3259744f0f  
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relevant to Xiaobo was censored, including candle emojis to represent mourning on Chinese 
social media.  
 The Citizen Lab analyzed this censorship through popular Chinese media apps WeChat 
and Weibo (Crete-Nishihata et al. 2018).53 In the case of WeChat, accounts connected to a 
Chinese mainland phone number would be subject to surveillance and censorship, even if the 
user later switched numbers to a non-domestic number. Likewise, images or text being sent to 
such an account would also be subject to censorship. This would be why individuals like Tashi 
feel suspicious when their applications do not operate as expected. 
 These are, of course, only examples from within the bounds of Chinese state authority 
and this thesis, while related, is not set to examine such internal policy in depth; however, when 
a Western company works to create a search engine specifically applicable to Chinese state 
censorship laws, we see the transnational nature of hegemonic authority once again.  
 One of the first examples of this dealt with Yahoo in the early 2000s. Yahoo as a 
company proclaimed to have libertarian values and believed fervently in the early dream of the 
internet ushering in a truly “deterritorialized” global future. The company encountered 
difficulties in France, first, a landmark court case found the search engine company going up 
against the authority of the French state to police their own areas of cyberspace. The French 
government was concerned about media content (such as Nazi-sympathizers and Holocaust 
deniers) having free reign in digital spaces when such things are illegal within the country. 
Yahoo stood its ground arguing that the French court did not have authority over a foreign 
company and that it would impossible for Yahoo to curb internet content within a specific 
                                              
53 https://web.archive.org/web/20170717140506/https://citizenlab.ca/2017/07/analyzing-censorship-of-the-death-of-
liu-xiaobo-on-wechat-and-weibo/  
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region. In 2001, Yahoo lost this case and was ordered to make an effort to curb such content 
within the state of France (Goldsmith and Wu 2006).  
 After their competitor, Google, began to rise in popularity, Yahoo sought out new 
territories in which to conduct business. They sought to gain a foothold in China, a state already 
cognizant of the issues of censoring internet content. The Chinese state demanded that Yahoo 
censor certain content according to the wishes of the CCP and in 2002, Yahoo agreed (Goldsmith 
and Wu 2006). Specifically, an incident of note should be examined here. In 2005, an activist in 
China named Shi Tao sent an email to a US website which contained recordings of a CCP 
meeting that discussed how to handle the anniversary of Tiananmen Square. Shi Tao used a 
Yahoo email address and, once the CCP found the content on the US site, demanded Yahoo help 
them identify the individual. Yahoo acquiesced and Shi Tao was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment. 
 Goldsmith and Wu (2006) examine this event as a specific example of terriortialized 
nature of cyberspace. They examine this in conjunction with other case studies proving that 
digital encounters are not free from global political and economic forms of governance. 
Geography and state hegemony are still important concepts in cyberspace. Indeed, in the Yahoo 
example, Chinese state authority compelled the obedience of a Western company to identify a 
user of its service in order to continue doing business within the territory, essentially making 
Yahoo an extension of Chinese state censorship.  
 A more recent example of this is Google’s “Project Dragonfly”, which was meant to be a 
competitor for the Chinese search engine, Baidu. The project was meant to introduce a Google 
developed search engine to Chinese cyberspace which was compatible with state censorship 
laws. As with the example of WeChat, users would have been connected to search results and 
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online activity by their phone numbers, further allowing for state surveillance (Smith 2018).54 
The project was leaked to Western media outlets by developers at Google, several of whom quit 
in response to the project. The story quickly became controversial, compounded by a new public 
wariness for digital media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and their involvement in the 
dissemination of “fake news” and foreign interference in political processes. One US lawmaker 
claimed that the project proved China’s “successful efforts to recruit Western companies to their 
information control efforts,” and Vice President Mike Pence lambasted the company for 
contributing to state censorship and authoritarian rule.  
 “Dragonfly” was actually a consequence of a preceding foray for the company in the 
Chinese market. Google launched a Chinese version of their popular search engine in 2006 and 
immediately received criticism from Chinese authorities who requested that their search results 
be censored based on blacklisted topics within the country, just like Yahoo. Also, like Yahoo, 
Google agreed. In 2010, the company was a victim of what is known as “Operation Aurora”, 
which was a sophisticated cyber-attack on several multi-national corporations. This led to many 
compromised Gmail accounts, notably several of which were Chinese human rights activists. It 
is believed that this was a Chinese state sponsored cyberattack performed by a unit of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Cyber Operations Tracker 2019).55 Google responded by 
acknowledging the attack, which other companies did not do for fear of their economic success 
within China, and claiming the Chinese state was responsible. Fitting their self-professed 
technological motto “don’t be evil”, they pulled their operations out of the country, with some 
services still available in Hong Kong.  
                                              
54 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/sep/18/google-china-dragonfly-search-engine  
55 https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations  
85 
 
Google, in its attempt to operate transnationally, seeks to develop technology befitting the 
wishes of the Chinese state, but, in doing so, their search engine would disenfranchise entire 
populations as the state saw fit. Brilliantly, a Tibetan artist lampooned this very concern in a 
political cartoon (Figure 4.1) published recently to The Tibetan Review, a digital news resource 
for the Tibetan community in exile. The cartoon depicts Google CEO Sundar Pichai behind a 
laptop addressing a large group of ethnic Uyghurs surrounded by barbed wire. He tells them “I 
can’t liberate you from the concentration camp, but I’ll be happy to exterminate you from the 
internet. OK?” 
 
Figure 4.1 
 This biting critique focuses not just on the subject of reports of ethnic suppression in 
Western China, but specifically on Google’s seemingly callous participation in covering up 
oppression through their development of “Project Dragonfly.” Pichai has also been outspoken 
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about Google’s use in Chinese businesses and digital infrastructure, despite apparently pulling 
out of the country after “Operation Aurora”. Through the “Dragonfly” project, Google becomes 
an explicit force in Chinese digital politics, disenfranchising those who fall in the margins of the 
state.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has served to examine the myriad ways in which transnational 
governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) is demonstrated in several different contexts. I have 
shown numerous examples of how my primary subject of the Tibetan diaspora is primarily 
affected, but others have been noted primarily due to their similarity and demonstration of a 
global pattern.  
 The focus of this chapter has been heavily state-centered, leaving little room for the 
agency of individuals that is one of the core interests of anthropology. Rather than examine these 
concepts in tandem, I have deemed it fit to do so separately. The subject of the state and 
transnational consequences of geopolitics in the digital era is important to not only our 
understandings of new technologies, but also of the effects they have on previously observed 
social processes.  
 Digital technologies connect the world better than any previous technology to date and 
they have therefore received much optimistic praise in their ability to unite; however, it is 
dangerous to ignore the very real ability of these technologies to divide, control, and suppress. 
This is especially interesting when such power becomes transnational. One could argue that these 
technologies merely show the progression in more efficient techniques of governing populations 
through advanced surveillance and censorship, as it has existed in the past. However, the 
globalized world is not so simple. If the world ever could be bounded within the imagined 
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communities of the nation-state (Anderson 1983), the connections and malleability of the global 
world and transnational fields (Schiller 2005) have rendered such analysis overly limited.  
 Moreover, the issue of cyberspace as a separate entity from traditional concepts of the 
physical reality are incredibly outdated given the physical consequences of seemingly innocuous 
acts within cyberspace. Roy Jones, Shi Tao, and so many more demonstrate that one’s actions in 
the digital environment can lead to very real and devastating consequences such as losing a job 
or imprisonment. In the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar and the dissemination of hate speech 
on Facebook, it led to death genocide.  
 Questions that need to be addressed when reflecting on these issues include to what 
extent digital media developers should be held responsible for these consequences. What is the 
ethical concern for corporations that provide state entities with surveillance technology or report 
individual users to state governments? How should issues of oppression be dealt with in refugee 
communities when faced with the economic threats of an imperial power? These questions are 
not new, but they must be addressed in new ways in light of such technological developments.  
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Chapter 5: Being Tibetan (Online): The Danger, Resistance, and Negotiation of Diasporic 
Identity in Cyberspace 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter was written at an auspicious moment in time. Every year the Tibetan 
diaspora community commemorates the anniversary of the March 10, 1959 Tibetan Uprising in 
Lhasa with fresh waves of protest, including street processions and protests before the Chinese 
consulate in major cities across the globe. This year marked the 60th anniversary of that tradition 
and brought with it a great deal of media attention, including a cover story in Time magazine 
featuring the Dalai Lama and other investigations of human rights in China from publications 
such as The Guardian56 and The Associated Press.57  
 All of this brought to bear a few things of importance. First, conclusions that the issue of 
Tibet and the question of Tibetan sovereignty were diminished in the West were proven 
inaccurate. Specifically, as has been mentioned in this thesis, those who argued that “no one talks 
about Tibet anymore” are mistaken. Indeed, even official political discourses on issues important 
to Tibetans have not been forgotten. In the previous year, The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act 
was made into law in the US, which requires that Congress be made aware annually of the 
restrictions imposed on diplomats and journalists wishing to travel to the Tibetan region in China 
and that no individual who contributes to said restrictions will be granted access to the US 
(Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018). For the 60th Anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day, 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi released a statement reaffirming American support for the Tibetan 
cause (Speaker of the House 2019).  
                                              
56 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/10/they-took-everyone-from-me-anger-lingers-60-years-after-tibet-
crackdown 
57 https://apnews.com/bc525ad851bc4211a0ad3f390ba6f4d1  
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 These events come on the heels of increased tensions between the West and China, 
including issues outlined in another chapter of this thesis on anxieties in the West of Chinese 
technological development and criticisms of human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region in China regarding labor camps and the Uighur ethnic population (see Keck 2018). It is 
not outside the realm of possibility (in fact it may be likely) that such offerings of support and 
protest to China are more to do with geopolitical anxieties of the nation-state’s increased 
economic viability in technology (as can be noted in the Huawei controversy in the US and 
Canada, which can be read about here: Keane 2019).58  
 But what about Tibetans living in diaspora? 
 This chapter does not deal with the geopolitical complexities of political economy 
(though they appear beneath the surface) as that is the goal of other chapters. Instead, this chapter 
focuses on the diasporic community as it exists online. Specifically, the evidence that I have 
gathered through traditional and digital ethnographic methods deals primarily with individuals in 
the US and sparingly in Canada (Toronto to be specific). Even more specifically, this chapter is 
about the digital technologies and/or cyberspace that connects them. I will examine what I 
identify to be the two main ways in which Tibetan youth use such technologies in their daily 
lives and outline the importance of each according to data gathered in interviews and through the 
scholarly literature on the subject. These paths include the use of digital technology as 1) a tool 
for activism and resistance to transnational hegemony and governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta 
2002) and 2) a space facilitating the negotiation of identity in diaspora.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
58 https://www.cnet.com/news/the-huawei-controversy-everything-you-need-to-know/ 
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Technology, Agency, and Resistance 
 
 In December of 2018, Pema Dolma, a Tibetan-American activist launched an Indiegogo 
campaign called “Insert Tibetan Flag Emoji”. As can be discerned from the title, the campaign’s 
goal is to officially add the Tibetan flag (Figure 5.1) to the “flags” section of emojis available on 
mobile phones. To accomplish this, the campaign will be required to submit a proposal to the 
Unicode Consortium, a group made up of large information technology companies such as 
Google and Apple.  
 
Figure 5.1 
 
 The author of the introduction describes the imperative of the campaign thusly: 
Flags represent the most comprehensive and universally recognised symbols through 
which communities around the world communicate their identity and a sense of 
belonging - yet the Tibetan flag is nowhere to be seen. Representation matters. We must 
remedy this.59  
Benedict Anderson (1983) described a nation as “an imagined political community-and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,” and that even though most members will 
never meet, they share in their minds an “image of their communion,” (6-7). Flags serve as 
representations of the imagined community and, in other words, form the literal image of 
communion among a nation. Moreover, according to Anderson, such symbols seek to represent 
                                              
59 https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/insert-tibetan-flag-emoji#/  
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the legitimacy and sovereignty of such imagined communities, without which the limited nature 
of the community becomes less defined. Specifically, the role of the flag in the imagined 
community is described by Leib and Webster (2007) to “‘condense’ a range of meanings and 
emotions pertaining to a group’s perceived common historical experience, real or imagined 
cultural homogeneity, and efforts to define a similarity of outlook for the future,” (31). One need 
not venture far in thought, therefore, to see the implications such an addition to an official list of 
emojis would have.  
In addition to the Indiegogo fundraising campaign, the activists introduced viral social media 
marketing to not only spread their cause, but also to demonstrate why the Tibetan Flag Emoji 
would be a benefit to the community. On the campaign’s official Instagram page (username: 
tibetflagemoji), a challenge was launched to post a photo with the #InstertTibetanFlag and a 
description outlining why the campaign was important to the user. As of this writing, over 600 
individuals participated in the Instagram challenge and more on other media platforms. Figures 
5.2 and 5.3 were created by the campaign to demonstrate the response. 
Therefore, it would be a definitive victory for Tibetans who would see their nation, their 
imagined community, represented in both a digital space (the software that houses the flag) and 
the discursive spaces in which the flag would be deployed. Even without official support from 
larger technology companies, Tibetans outside of China and their allies will still use the flag in 
online discursive spaces (in either a .gif or image format, see Figure 5.4). In instances where I 
have seen this phenomenon, it has been in response to a post or comment attempting to 
undermine Tibetan national identity, such as news stories relating to Chinese state censorship or 
language restriction. The act of deploying the flag in these situations is therefore political as well 
as cultural. 
92 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
 
Figure 5.3 
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It is to be expected that the adoption of the Tibetan flag within the emoji lexicon would 
prompt backlash from Chinese state authorities (based on evidence presented in Chapter 4). 
Likely, the geopolitical context of the flag and the Chinese state’s history of transnational 
censorship efforts will draw the Chinese state’s ire. This is especially likely given the 
increasingly important stake tech giants like Google have in China.  
Regardless of what may be, the concern I felt was valid enough to broach with Pasang, who 
works with the campaign. Her response was: 
That's one of the challenges of it. So, if you look at the, um, the bylaws of the Emoji 
Committee and what reasons they would have to object to this. First of all, they don't take 
flags that are like kind of political symbols. They only take flags that are representatives 
of identities that people hold in the communities and if enough people hold an identity, 
then they will put the flag in. Kind of as like the general consensus of the flag issue. So, I 
think moving that flag away from being a political image. I mean it'll always be a 
political image when, when there is like a huge, massive powerful country like China and 
a thing like this country [here she refers to Tibet] doesn't exist. Having a flag that 
represents that country will always be a political issue I feel. But essentially, yeah, 
essentially if we're able to kind of create a cultural presence for the identity and show just 
how important it is to someone's cultural identity…I think that is the main argument of 
our campaign. 
Her response is enlightening in a number of regards. Specifically, she accepts the expected 
challenge the campaign will face in regard to the political nature of the flag as a symbol of a 
nation the Chinese state insists does not exist. Tibetan activists are not naive nor ignorant of 
transnational governmentally and power. When she notes that Tibet does not exist, she is not 
referring to the Tibetan nation, but rather the state of Tibet. Most importantly, she argues that an 
attempt, at least, should be made to separate the flag as a cultural symbol from the political 
controversy that would envelop it.  
I can make no better argument than the activists themselves made in their official proposal to 
the Unicode Consortium following the completion of the campaign’s fundraising:  
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There is certainly precedent for this inclusion, with other major regions of China, such as 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, already listed for RGI. In addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, for Tibetans, whether they live in Tibet or as part of the worldwide diaspora, 
the flag of Tibet is not a sub-regional flag but their national flag. For them, the ability to 
express their identity via emoji would be extremely beneficial…The fact that Tibet is a 
contested region and not a UN member state is clearly not a barrier as this applies to 
many other flags that are currently RGI. Both Palestine and Western Sahara currently 
have RGI flags despite being disputed territories. In fact, Taiwan’s flag is RGI despite 
also being viewed by some as a disputed region of China (Tibetan Flag Emoji website 
2019, emphasis mine).60 
The reference to Palestine and Taiwan does not help to disentangle the flag from its political 
symbolism, but it does seek to highlight the hypocrisy of a contingency in which these flags are 
given official status and Tibet is not. More than that however, the entirety of the campaign, the 
backers involved in fundraising, and the individuals who helped to spread the message are a part 
of a large network of agents seeking to resist the homogenization and erasure of Tibetan identity. 
The activists behind this campaign highlight the reverse of my previously pessimistic 
observations of technology and identity. In short, they demonstrate the agency of individuals and 
groups to resist hegemonic authority through technology (in this case many different 
technologies, e.g. crowdfunding, social media, and emojis on mobile phones).  
John Postill (2014) refers to such agents as “freedom technologists” or “to refer to those 
geeks, hackers, online journalists, tech lawyers and other social agents who combine 
technological skills with political acumen to pursue greater Internet and democratic freedoms, 
both globally and domestically,” (2). Specifically of interest, Postill (2014) does not identify 
“freedom technologists” as techno-utopians (as Morozov (2012) critiqued) or “slacktivists” 
(Skoric 2012, cited in Postill 2014). Rather, he argues that such social agents are actually 
“techno-pragmatists” who have very realistic ideas of the limitations as well as the possibilities 
                                              
60 https://www.tibetflagemoji.com/blog/2019/2/12/read-the-proposal 
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of new digital technologies for political movements. I believe Tibetans, especially younger 
digital “natives”, fall squarely in this category.  
Not only do Tibetans understand the limiting aspects of said technologies (see Chapters 3 and 
4 on digital surveillance), but they also see the potential in technology to free them from the 
constraints of diaspora and dislocation.  For example, Pasang noted that she did not feel more or 
less Tibetan in online spaces; however, she did feel that the scope of her connection to the 
Tibetan diaspora was enhanced through these technologies, not even considering the benefits 
such mediums provide to activism. Here she illustrates her point in response to my question of 
whether or not she felt a difference in Tibetanness in digital spaces compared to physical ones: 
I would say like I think it's, it's more about like scope. It's more about the scope. Like for 
example, I had the capacity to engage in those communities on a wider scope than in 
person. But I think nothing really beats in person. Like in person the things that me and 
my local Tibetan young students do is we'll get together once a week or like once a 
month for like ‘momo night’ where we just like sit together and they actually physically 
make food and eat and laugh. And I think there's nothing that beats that. I guess in terms 
of feeling at one with the community, like being with other Tibetans and cook and eat 
food from our country and talking in our language and doing our own thing. You know, 
kind of like that feels, I think I feel more connected with my identity in that case, but I 
can't do that every day. And before I moved, I didn't really have that opportunity even 
once a month. So I think it's more of scope than depth. 
She later explained that she did feel that technology was more effective when it came to 
organizing disparate groups, such as Tibetans and their allies, behind a cause (this has also been 
shown elsewhere, see Phillips 2008, 2014) She herself had worked a number of projects 
organized and marketed through social media, including work for Students for a Free Tibet and 
their “Tibet’s Rivers, Asia’s Lifelines” initiative, which was launched and advertised via 
YouTube. She explained her own opinions on technology and the boon it provides to the 
diaspora as such: 
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Obviously you see like the Arab springs and everything like that and then also India is 
one of the countries that has like the highest, the fastest growing rate of access to internet 
through mobile phones and data plans and whatnot. And that has a big impact on 
Tibetans. So now anywhere you go, whether you're at a refugee school in Tibet or in 
Switzerland or in New York City, like all these Tibetans are kind of connected on these 
platforms. And I think the most important thing for me is it, it's just been in the past year, 
I think one year that's really compounded (sic) with are so many accounts, social media 
accounts on Facebook. Like pages and stuff on Instagram that really unify the messaging 
that people are receiving I think puts people on the same page. I think that's really 
important in creating like a solid identity for Tibetans. A big concern is always that for 
me it's like I noticed right away like if this is a Tibetan who spent a lot of time in Nepal 
and who has spent a lot of time in India and they both immigrated to the same country 
even after five or six years, usually they're hanging out in different groups.  
Here she highlights the same fractured identities that Pema identified to me. Pema noted that 
her own sense of identity was made up of all the places she had lived, which differentiated her 
from her first-generation refugee parents. In her words, she describes why her multicultural 
background would make her feel alien if she ever returned to Tibet: 
The culture that I was raised in was multicultural. I am in a Tibetan culture and not just 
Tibetan but an Indian culture and now I am in America and I am like mixed up in so 
many different cultures, unlike my parents. My parents would feel more welcome than 
maybe me. Because, for me, it would just feel alien. 
Of note here is how typical this is of disaporic communities and the children of refugees (see 
Bernal 2014; Hall 1990; Lanzelius 2006; Lauer 2015; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Ong 1999, 2003 ; 
Yeh 2007), but also how one’s identity is not necessarily tied to the geographic homeland or an 
idea of “return”.  
In addition to such concepts of diaspora, the marginalized nature of the Tibetan community 
lends itself to Scott’s (1985) examination of agency among the peasant class in Malaysia. He 
argued that the agency of the individual is notable in the everyday application of resistance to a 
hegemonic authority. He called the tools through which marginalized groups practice agency and 
resistance the “weapons of the weak”. Alongside Postill’s concept of the “freedom technologist”, 
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this demonstrates the ways in which these tools may be utilized for the benefit of marginalized 
group activism and identity maintenance where they would otherwise be challenged by what 
Victoria Bernal (2014) has termed the “infopolitical state”, the state hegemony through which 
information is censored, controlled, and disseminated.  
The “weapons” of Tibetan netizens and activists are therefore platforms on which their cause 
may be amplified and their information less easily buried by an infopolitical state authority. 
Further, given this optimistic interpretation of social media technologies, the efforts of Chinese 
hegemons to censor digital efforts abroad is troubling. Efforts of resistance through the use of 
digital technology are more thoroughly detailed ahead. 
Activists, NGOs, and the Internet 
 
In this section, I will cover three case studies of NGOs working with Tibetans within China 
and in diaspora. In focus specifically is the transnational nature of each of these groups and also 
their focus and presence on digital media. To preface these case studies, I identify a 
philosophical divide I have observed among Tibetan activists.  
The work of NGOs is of particular importance in the globalized world. There is a debate 
among scholars as to the effect, either positive or negative, of NGOs transnationally as they 
inherently tied to the state and the neoliberal globalized world (Bernal and Grewal 2014). Does 
the NGO weaken the relationship between the state and citizens or does it enhance the agency of 
individual citizens against state apparatuses? The answer to this question would largely depend 
on context. Mark Schuller (2012) has demonstrated the ways in which NGOs may become de 
facto state forces despite their intentions and has previously argued against the idea of the 
“neoliberal aid regime”, as NGOs become intermediaries of the world system and become the 
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glue holding fragmented and weakened neoliberal conceptions such as divided states and state 
authority (209).  
Bernal and Grewal (2014) point to the arguments that NGOs working within the neoliberal 
world system offer an alternative to traditional development strategies (a point which Schuller 
(2012) counters) and that some scholars have pointed to ability of NGOs to provide checks to 
unbalanced state power. These points can be observed in the application of NGOs to issues 
examined by Escobar (1995) and Srinivasan (2017) on the creation of the third world and the 
uneven development and access to technology globally, respectively. I argue that the case studies 
examined below demonstrate multiple perspectives on the NGO. First, Students for a Free Tibet 
are starkly outside of the control of the state, but insert themselves in numerous transnational 
causes, seeking to place a check on the Chinese state from outside of its (physical) boundaries. 
Another organization I reference below is Rangzen – International Tibet Independence 
Movement, which also fits within the first category alongside SFT. Second, Machik 
demonstrates precisely the neoliberal development NGO identified above. They work within the 
state for the development of Tibetan social and educational infrastructure. Finally, Tibetan 
Action Institute serves as an example of a hybrid between the two, offering technological 
interventions and council to groups with activist goals. 
Philosophical Divide  
 
There is a subtle philosophical divide among the Tibetan diaspora and its organizations. 
As Nowak (1984) examines, there are two identifiable philosophies of Tibetan activism: the 
rangzen path and the “middle way” approach. The first, rangzen, argues for separatism and true 
independence for the Tibetan people from Chinese rule. In other words, it signals that Tibet 
cannot truly be free whilst under the yoke of Chinese hegemonic oppression. The second, 
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labelled the “middle way” by participants such as Pema and Pasang, is immediately indicative of 
Buddhist philosophy (and the Dalai Lama). It is the compromise between two extremes 
(independence and subjugation with no freedom).   
To demonstrate this difference, let us consider the mission statement of another 
organization, this one with the word rangzen (independence) literally it its name. Tashi pointed 
me towards “Rangzen – International Tibet Independence Movement (ITIM)”, an organization 
founded in 1995 by Thupten Jigme Norbu (the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother) and Larry Gerstein. 
ITIM’s mission statements read as such: “We are dedicated to restoring Tibet’s independence 
(rangzen) from China through non-violent action. Since 1997 we have advocated for rangzen by 
leading peace marches for Tibet’s independence covering thousands of miles across North 
America,” and “We march to sustain and support Tibetan culture; to raise awareness about the 
crisis in Tibet; and because 6 million Tibetans in Tibet cannot,” (ITIM website 2014).61 It is in 
that last phrase that one might recall with renewed importance Tashi’s criticism of Americans 
who are “too careful” about upsetting China.  
Now, juxtapose this with what Pasang told me about her experience as a Tibetan-
American activist. In her words (and, for context, she is referring to the protests described earlier 
commemorating the March 10th Uprising in Lhasa, this one taking place in New York City): 
There are some Tibetans who believe in like the “middle path” and some will believe in 
like the rangzen path…there is like a tendency for even Tibetans that are “middle way” to 
censor those that are rangzen. Like, for example, at the March 10th protest in, I think it 
was 2015, there were Tibetans carrying “Free Tibet” signs that they made on their own. 
And actually those from the community that were pro-“middle path” actually told them, 
“Hey, you guys can't carry those signs.” At the March 10th protests! And there was 
actually an altercation which almost led to like, well it was like a very heated altercation 
after which the police came over. They were like “What's the problem?” And then the 
gentleman said “Oh he can't carry that sign,” to, you know, the man who had the Free 
                                              
61 http://www.rangzen.org/about-us/ 
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Tibet sign. And the police said “Isn't this a Free Tibet rally?” 
The police officer who asked, “Isn’t this a ‘Free Tibet’ rally?” may be forgiven, I think, for not 
understanding the nuance there, as I myself was unaware of the distinction before Tashi and 
Pasang told me about their beliefs. Pasang also made an interesting observation about those who 
partake in activism regardless of one’s philosophy: 
It's an unfortunate reality that many Tibetans in our generation are aware that they must 
make decisions. So, when I engage in political discussions, I know that I'm sacrificing 
visiting Tibet, which is where I'm like, you know, my family is from for generations. 
Here, she clarified for me that some Tibetans in diaspora (though not her as she has no family in 
the region) would feel that it is necessary to be “middle path” so as not to jeopardize their access 
to the region, or, as noted elsewhere in this thesis, to put their family in harm’s way.  
 Pema also had some interesting observations about the nature of politics in the Tibetan 
community. She argues: 
Yeah. I feel like I don’t do it as much as I used to do earlier because personally, I feel like 
there is more important things to talk about right now, like education in Tibet, like 
employment inside Tibet.  I mean its…we try to stay away from the political issues, 
because I feel that the political issues is kind of diverting our attention away from things 
that are more important. Like, not more important but as important as environmental 
issues inside of Tibet, like the educational issues inside of Tibet. 
She also noted that some of her peers have a more frustrated and pessimistic approach to the idea 
of the homeland and Chinese sovereignty:  
They were like “So what if Tibet becomes free? So what if we can travel back to Tibet?” 
I really don’t know. 
In my field notes, I marked that, at this point in the interview, Pema seemed rather exasperated 
(though not impatient) with the concept of politics, or, more specifically, fighting against the 
dominance of global Chinese hegemony. That is not to say that any of my participants (including 
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those examples observed online) felt that it was not worthwhile to engage in activism and 
resistance to the erasure of Tibetan culture, far from it.  
There seems to a shift in younger generations of Tibetans towards a philosophy of 
pragmatism, meaning that the application of activist energy is best placed in pathways most 
likely to succeed and benefit the Tibetan population (both within Tibet and globally).  Indeed, 
regardless of one’s place on the philosophical spectrum, there are numerous instances of Tibetan 
agency and resistance worth noting. 
Students for a Free Tibet 
 
Far and away the most active of Tibetan activist group online is the international 
“Students for a Free Tibet”. Founded in 1994 in New York City, this chapter-based non-profit 
organization rose to prominence through their collaboration with the Milarepa Fund, a non-profit 
founded by Adam Yauch (of Beastie Boys fame) and Erin Potts, in the organization of “Tibetan 
Freedom Concerts” of the 1990s. These “Live-Aid”-style concerts, featuring seminal rock acts of 
the 90s such as The Smashing Pumpkins and The Red Hot Chili Peppers, were designed to raise 
awareness and funds for Tibetan causes and contributed to the height of the “Free Tibet” 
movement in the US. The money raised here and in other fundraising activities helped to 
establish international chapters of the organization, such as those in India, Canada, and the UK. 
In this chapter, all three of those charters are important as they demonstrate transnational 
connections (Hannerz 1996) and the interconnectedness of diasporic individuals through such 
organizations.  
 Students for a Free Tibet describe their mission as such: “Through education, grassroots 
organizing, and nonviolent direct action, we campaign for Tibetans’ fundamental right to 
102 
 
political freedom,” (Students for a Free Tibet website).62 This mission statement is clever, as it 
does not mention political independence or sovereignty per se and is line with the changing 
political philosophy of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile since 1959. In short, as 
time has gone on, the political reality of Chinese domination of the Tibetan plateau has become 
more total and therefore the goals of the movement have shifted from strict independence to 
“genuine autonomy” (Nowak 1984; Brinkerhoff 2009; Sangay 2018). However, a review of their 
website and social media presence will note a continuous use of the words “free” and 
“independent”. This would make their organization a clear target for the Chinese state to label 
them “separatists” as is often the case with Tibetan NGOs.  
 The organization maintains a presence on their personal website63 as well as on multiple 
social media sites such as Facebook,64 Instagram,65 and Twitter.66 More complexly, the large, 
chapter-based organization also maintains pages for different nation-states in which the chapter 
is based. For example, “SFT - India”, “SFT - Japan”, “SFT - Denmark” all operate their own 
social media sites and choose individually which ones to utilize and which to exclude. For 
activist work, the largest concentration of activity for the largest of these chapters (the main US 
branch and the Indian chapter) is on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook respectively. Several 
universities, such as the University of Massachusetts - Amherst and University of Washington, 
also maintain chapters on their campuses. 
 Aside from being largely present on various social media platforms and serving as the 
predominant form of activism within the Tibetan exile community, the group also targets specific 
                                              
62 https://studentsforafreetibet.org/our-work/ 
63 https://studentsforafreetibet.org/ 
64 https://www.facebook.com/StudentsforaFreeTibet/ 
65 https://www.instagram.com/sft_international/ 
66 https://twitter.com/SFTHQ/ 
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causes that they deem specifically important to Tibet and related groups. As of this writing, 
campaigns that are in focus include many of the notable issues my participants have identified. 
Pasang alone noted the “Tibet’s Rivers, Asia’s Lifelines” and “Free Tashi Wangchuk” initiatives, 
though the latter she did not specifically note, but hinted at. These along with the topics of 
Google’s “Project Dragonfly” and the Confucius Institutes are platforms the group highlights.  
 Specifically, the group has recently been active against the “Dragonfly” project. Figure 
5.4 shows the group protesting outside of the congressional testimony of Sundar Pichai in 
December of 2018. Notably, the group posted to Twitter throughout the day and shared articles 
related to “Dragonfly” to spread awareness of their protest and its connection to Tibet and the 
Uighur crisis in Xinjiang. Both are subjects more thoroughly examined in Chapter 4, but here it 
should be noted that the dangers of technological monopoly and omnipresence are not lost on 
freedom technologists such as these (Postill 2014). Linked on their webpage on the subject is the 
open letter to Google from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit focusing on 
civil liberties and digital technology, which described the concerns of censorship and human 
rights violations by the Chinese state (O’Brien 2018).67  
Machik 
One of the more traditional NGOs regarding Tibet is Machik. Machik was founded by 
husband and wife Phuntsok and Tsering Rabgey in order raise money and fund the creation of a 
school in Kham, Eastern Tibet. The NGO’s website notes that the Chungba Primary School was 
opened in 2002 with support from American businessman Chris Walters (affiliated with other  
                                              
67 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/human-rights-groups-sundar-pichai-listen-your-employees-and-halt-
project-dragonfly?fbclid=IwAR3DOqgAxbJaWcmXw9g-smRjgbM2j8-OTDuub6jJhCctjWBH8hR-5REYBh0 
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Figure 5.4 (Image credit: Students for a Free Tibet website 2019) 
Central Asian education NGOs such as Bakarat68). Machik focuses on “social innovation in 
Tibet” and is primarily concerned with educational projects in rural counties in Kham. 
Of interest here is the organization’s focus on using digital technologies in revitalizing 
Tibetan language learning in the region. According to their website: 
Our work in this area has ranged from supporting local NGOs in building Tibetan-
language online resources, establishing a digital classroom at the Chungba Middle 
School, to the development of the Mobile Digital Library, a pilot project designed in 
partnership with the Tibetan Himalayan Library to provide offline resources to schools 
and community libraries in remote rural areas. As part of our broader commitment to 
valuing local knowledge, we have partnered with the Maysles Film Institute and the 
Kham Film Project to facilitate the production of participatory video projects. 
In fact, other transnational media undertakings have been organized by the organization. 
Their social media presence is small, but they work with a number of institutions, such as 
                                              
68 https://barakatworld.org/about  
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Columbia University’s Digital Media Center, to design and disseminate media resources 
regarding Tibetan culture and language. One such endeavor among the Chungba Project is the 
collaborative film efforts of students. One of the highlights of the project was the creation of an 
advisory video arguing against doing drugs and littering (comparable to a Western after school 
special). This was created by and for Tibetan students and can be found on YouTube (“Making 
Good Choices” 2008).69 However, the Machine YouTube page is not particularly active in 
showcasing these projects and they are disseminated rarely.  
The organization also funds several women’s initiatives in Tibet as well as self-sustainability 
initiatives and the implementation of environmentally friendly “green” technology. Finally, the 
NGO also seeks to highlight and support the work of what they call “Tibetan social 
entrepreneurs”. This includes the work of directors and film entrepreneurs, advocates for women, 
and language activists.  
I have highlighted this NGO for two reasons. First, it was identified to me by a participant, 
Pema, as a particularly important avenue for the future of Tibetan activism. She argued that 
Tibetan energy was better placed in pragmatic solutions such as development initiatives. She 
argued that education and infrastructure were more valuable than the politics of true 
independence. As noted above, this puts her at odds with many other Tibetans in the West. 
However, I also do not think that her arguments were clearly against the idea of Tibetan 
independence; rather, I think she was being pragmatic and showed what I have come to know as 
a nuance of perspective among Tibetans in exile. Tsering Wangmo Dhompa (2016), a Tibetan 
refugee born in India, wrote about such nuance in her memoir Coming Home to Tibet. She wrote: 
My hope is unsteady because I have been to Tibet and I have seen just how entrenched 
the Chinese are in my country. It is hard to imagine the Chinese will give up what they 
                                              
69 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUTodfN9kV4  
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have sought to destroy and then to build in the last five decades. Within this anomaly and 
within these complexities, hope for a free Tibet seems a punitive effort. But to give up 
hope would signify worse: the end of all possibilities for a different future (188). 
This identifies perfectly the pragmatic perspective of many younger Tibetans in exile, whilst 
distinguishing such a perspective from pessimism.  
My second goal in examining Machik is to demonstrate the transnational actions of NGOs in 
language/cultural revitalization and development, which will be covered further below. 
 
Tibet Action Institute 
Tibet Action Institute (TAI) is the most digitally inclined of any Tibetan group. This is 
because digital media tools and interventions are their specific focus. Several of their projects are 
interesting to note, and Pasang made specific note of them to me once when she referred to a 
workshop which warned her against using WeChat. That is an excellent introduction to the work 
that TAI does. 
When you first enter the website for the organization, one will notice immediately that it has, 
like the website for Students for a Free Tibet, an intuitive and attractive design. This contrasts 
with Machik, which seems dated and meant only to convey what text information the authors 
want advertised. In the case of TAI, the focus on social media and digital tools is evident from 
the Twitter ticker (an interface showing the most recent tweets) scrolling down the right side of 
the page.  Their mission statement reads as: 
Tibet Action Institute combines the power of digital communication tools with strategic 
nonviolent action to build the strength and effectiveness of the Tibet movement. We 
bring together thought leaders, campaigners, and technology experts at the forefront of 
the Tibet movement to develop and implement visionary strategies designed to help 
Tibetans win their nonviolent struggle for human rights and freedom. Through innovative 
training, education, and technology development programs, we equip Tibetans with new 
tools and strategies to help them win in their struggle for human rights and freedom in 
Tibet (TAI website, 2019). 
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The thesis here is clear: they provide new, digital freedom fighting tools to the Tibetan 
activist. This is the definition of Postill’s (2014) “freedom technologist”. In some cases, their 
initiatives seem to be direct responses to issues related in Chapter 4 and identified by groups 
such as CitizenLab at the University of Toronto. One such initiative is on “Digital Security” and 
the group has compiled a number of helpful guides to protect Tibetans abroad and those they 
contact within the state of China (TAI website, 2019). Figures 5.5 and 5.6 identify some of these.  
 
Figure 5.5 
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Figure 5.6 
Specifically, under the module “Don’t Let Bad Apps Crash Your Party”, instructions and 
warnings are given to users about the permissions they give certain apps. While they do not 
mention any app by name, the warnings should bring to mind issues examined in Chapters 3 and 
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4 of this thesis, specifically regarding WeChat and Facebook. In the case of WeChat, the site 
specifically notes that “certain apps” can record conversations and report information to the 
Chinese government.  
A promising project under development currently from the group is what they call “The Tibet 
Crisis Map” (TAI website 2019).70 This is a GIS mapping project which utilizes software such as 
Ushahidi (developed to map reports of violence in Kenya in 2008) and Open Street Map (GPS) 
to create a real-time visualization of “crisis points” in the Tibetan region. Examples of such 
incidences would include protests, crackdowns, and natural disasters. This is an exciting project 
and has implications for transparency within the Tibetan region, provided that workarounds can 
be found regarding the “Great Firewall” of China (Goldsmith and Wu 2006).  
Instagram and Negotiating Transnational Identity 
Tibetan identities vary and are negotiated both inside and out of cyberspace and it is through 
digital mediums such as Instagram and Facebook where those experiences are shared, negotiated 
and even constructed. This section deals with a case study of cyberspace: the Instagram page of a 
group called “Youth of Tibet”. I have also gathered data through participant observation both 
online and off in other settings, such as in closed meme groups which I cannot explicitly include 
posts or identifying information from, ethically. Rather, these anecdotal observations will serve 
as supplements to larger patterns within the community such as those observed by other scholars. 
In addition, memes used as evidence herein have been gathered from publicly available sources 
rather than closed groups from which they may have been reposted.  
First, it should be noted that the negotiation of diasporic identity online is not new territory 
and is predicated by the research of both Victoria Bernal (2005, 2014) and Jennifer M. 
                                              
70 https://tibetaction.net/tibet-crisis-map/  
110 
 
Brinkerhoff (2009, 2012), the latter of whom specifically analyzed a case study of Tibetan 
cyberspace on the now defunct TibetBoard. In her examination of the website, Brinkerhoff 
(2012) notes that diasporas mobilize online for numerous reasons, such as to cultivate and 
negotiate identity or to gain political or economic advantage through activism. In the case of the 
Tibetan diaspora, digital technologies have been used for both. 
The Instagram page for “Youth of Tibet” consists of images of youthful Tibetans posted with 
sometimes large amounts of text describing their lives, struggles, and dreams. Figure 5.7 shows 
the main page for the account.  
 
Figure 5.7 
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The page has 151 posts as of March 2019. Notably, the page does not simply highlight the 
lives of prominent Tibetans within the community, such as activists or leaders in prominent 
groups. This, I would argue, would defeat the purpose of the account’s existence. Rather, these 
images and the stories attached to them are digital reminders of the everyday and the variety of 
the complex and vibrant community that makes up the diaspora. This bit of cyberspace provides 
a common ground where disparate stories and identities may be collected for all to see. For 
Tibetans, and indeed many communities in diaspora, this would be significant. Recall Pasang’s 
note that, while nothing could surpass the connection felt through physical meetings, there was 
something to the scope of representation offered by cyberspace. Specifically, she commented on 
the dispersal of Tibetan communities and the importance of representation and belonging: 
So, I think in that sense, because of the fact that the Tibetan diaspora is so dispersed, 
there's no like high concentration unless you live somewhere like Jackson Heights or 
Toronto, like in Parkdale, like you don't have that concentration of communities. So I 
think in that sense when you go online right now, for me at least, I have at least a dozen 
or two accounts that just solely post content about Tibetan culture. And that was like 
something that wasn't possible even five years ago. 
Above I am very deliberate with my words that this page shares lives, struggles, and dreams. 
The photographer seems to have asked participants to tell them a bit of their biography. Most 
posts begin with this information, but many times, it seems the post was edited to include only 
the relevant or most interesting information. Responses tend to involve where the participant is 
from and how they came to their current situations. Often, they describe their dreams and their 
hopes for the future of representing the Tibetan diaspora and keeping the culture alive. 
Sometimes, the post will focus on the struggle of living in exile. One individual, identified as 
Tenzin (25)—the center photo in Figure 5.7—related a story of a failed school trip to Shanghai 
due to suspicious circumstances: 
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Our school had planned a one-week trip to Shanghai as part of our studies. Therefore, a 
school worker collected all our passports and applied for our visa. One week later I got 
notified that I had randomly been picked to personally apply for my visa at the Chinese 
embassy in Zurich. As soon as I got there, an employee of the embassy looked at me and 
my name and told me that I again, randomly got chosen to have an interview. When she 
wrote down my name for the list of interviewees, I saw that the one above me was a 
Tenzin as well. I walked in for the interview one week later and the Tibetan interviewer 
asked me about informations (sic) that were already mentioned in my documents. After 
that, he got more into politics. “Do you think we’re changing Tibet for the better? Are 
you part of the Tibetan Youth Association? Did you participate in demonstrations?” etc. I 
answered “Yes, I did and do go to demonstrations.” They would’ve found out anyways. 
The interview didn’t last long after that and he told me they’ll keep me updated. But they 
did not. 
Meanwhile, I only had one week left before our departure, the embassy had not taken any 
of my calls and didn’t reply to my professors and my own messages or emails. So I 
personally went to the embassy again. They told me they couldn’t do anything since the 
documents have been sent to Beijing for further investigations. I didn’t know who else to 
contact so I wrote the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs who provided me with an 
appointment in the Chinese embassy in Bern. There, I was told that my visa application 
was refused before it even got to Beijing. I could have applied for a new Visa but with 
the length of the procedure I would’ve missed most of the trip.  
The airplane left three days later with the other students. The same night I got a call from 
the embassy in Zurich saying my visa got refused. 
I mean I really tried everything you can imagine to get my visa. I even tried to consult the 
state but nothing I did seemed to help. What bothers me the most isn’t even the money I 
lost. It just would’ve been a nice trip with my friends and a good ending of our last 
semester together but I wasn’t granted that pleasure. (Youth of Tibet Instagram 2019). 
I have included the entirety of his response because it touches on a number of subjects of 
importance. First, he notes the futility of trying to hide anything from the Chinese state, despite 
him living in Switzerland. He says “They would have found out anyway.” He notes the 
difficulties of bureaucracy and the frustration he felt at being singled out and told nothing of his 
visa application.  
Other posts range from discussions of issues with mental illness and self-harm to success 
stories of athletic accomplishments and activism. In each case, dedicated commenters will post 
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their well-wishes, admirations, and comments of solidarity with those in diaspora. Notably, the 
trend of the comments returns to either shared experiences of diaspora and the woes that come 
alongside exile and issues of system harm by a powerful transnational hegemon, in this case 
China.  
Another example of community dialogue online is memes. Since the advent of social media 
various niched groups have cultivated specific areas of cyberspace where they can develop a 
sense of community perhaps not possible in the physical world. This has been documented and 
examined in depth by a number of scholars and I will not expand on the phenomenon here (but 
see Bernal 2014; Boellstorff 2008; Brinkerhoff 2009; Nardi 2010; Taylor 2006, 2012, 2018). An 
underlying trend in all of this social science research is that of the concept of “mimetic kinship” 
(Davidov and Andersen 2008), an extension of the anthropological theory of “fictive kinship” 
which sees community building as a complex series of connections crafting “inside” and 
“outside” groups not dependent on biological or legal definitions of kin. Specifically in the case 
of mimetic kinship, Davidov and Andersen (2008) note that is a community built and defined 
through online modes of imitation or online tribalism. I will note the ways in which the Tibetan 
diaspora, particularly Tibetans from North America, engage with social media and “meme 
groups” and reflect this form of kinship.  
A trend of cyberspace in recent years has been the construction of social media pages and 
groups dedicated to sharing memes, or images that mimic a lived experience of the user. The 
word “meme” comes from the Greek mimēma, which means “that which is imitated”, and the 
word “gene”. It was coined by Richard Dawkins in his 1976 book The Selfish Gene to provide an 
explanatory framework for how cultural information is disseminated. This comparison to biology 
welcomed the analogy of viruses and was expanded on by Mike Godwin (1994) in Wired to the 
114 
 
Internet. He argued that a meme “is an idea that functions in a mind the same way a gene or virus 
functions in the body. And an infectious idea (call it a "viral meme") may leap from mind to 
mind, much as viruses leap from body to body.”71 That comparison has been immensely helpful 
to the understanding of memes in popular culture in the modern world and, even further, the 
understanding of cultural information sharing. 
In this way, meme groups offer identity affirmation through the sharing of experiential 
memes. Over the years a number of groups have attempted to create such mimetic spaces. As 
pointed out by Brinkerhoff (2009), Tibetans have fostered community dialogue online through 
forum boards such as TibetBoard (now defunct). In addition, previous platforms that have been 
used include Myspace, AOL, and an early social networking site that specifically targeted the 
Asian demographic called AsianAve (founded in 1997). Now, as I have noted, user interaction 
can occur in numerous online locals, from Facebook to Reddit. Recently, a trend of groups with 
the name “subtle [insert ethnic or social group] traits” has emerged on Facebook. This is an 
ethnographer’s dream. The users share what they identify to be quintessential pieces of lived 
experience that might be missed by an outsider and proves to be one of the better sources of epic 
perspective I have observed. Tibetans, specifically, have created such a group with almost 3,000 
members as of this writing. I cannot divulge its name as it is a closed group (I was invited by a 
participant), but I will share what memes I can find which are available publicly and have been 
observed in such groups. 
Figure 5.8 shows some examples of these memes. In order from the top left and moving 
clockwise, I will examine the memes briefly for clarity. The “one does not simply…” meme 
template was popular throughout the early to mid-2010s. It seeks to reference something 
                                              
71 https://www.wired.com/1994/10/godwin-if-2/ 
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difficult, or exaggerate a tough choice. In this case, the creator seeks to illustrate the difficulty 
some Tibetan youth face in learning to read, write, and speak Tibetan in diaspora. Next, the 
image of actor Liam Neeson is taken from the film Taken and is referencing the rather ubiquitous 
nature of the name “Tenzin” among Tibetans. In the bottom left, the image of a skeleton 
illustrates how the creator feels about the pressure faced by Tibetan youth to marry and 
procreate. The last image is more subtle and can be confusing to those who are not familiar with 
Tibetan online humor. A common joke in the online Tibetan diaspora community is that 
“momos” (Tibetan dumplings) are the main staple of the ethnic Tibetan diet. In this image, the 
joke is that the crying woman is expressing disappointment that the Irish bar, where, of course, 
one would not expect to find Tibetan dumplings, is out of momos. The humor is in the idea that 
Tibetans wish to find momos everywhere. There is a similar meme that shows Tibetan blood 
containing momos instead of red blood cells. 
Large trends tend to be focused on Tibetan food, such as the momo (dumpling). As with 
internet memes in general, there are brief periods of time in which posters will focus on certain 
topics. For example, during Losar (Tibetan New Year), posters will share experiences related to 
the celebrations. For a month after Losar, posts tended to involve momos (making them or eating 
them) in some way. As Pasang noted, this shared cultural experience, especially related to shared 
celebrations and culinary practices, is important in fostering a sense of community in diaspora.  
As with Instagram, the comments section on these posts is where either the affirmation or 
negotiation of these cultural experiences and practices occur. One notable example occurred on 
February 22, 2019 (the post is now deleted, so I rely on my field notes). In a comment thread 
responding to a meme on Tibetan endogamy (pressure to marry inside the group), an individual 
posted “no enji (non-Tibetan) wife pls!” This apparently upset another community member and 
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Figure 5.8 
she posted a screenshot to the larger group shaming the individual, writing “Can someone please 
tell [username] that love is love!” This was not the only time where this part of the Tibetan lived 
experience was noted and negotiated. Another meme (Figure 5.9) noted the anxiety one user felt 
about how Tibetan parents (in this case amala, which means “mother”) felt about catching 
Tibetan youth dating outsiders (enji). 
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Figure 5.9 
Typically, users will respond by either connecting with the distress of the image or arguing 
that it is outdated and their parents do not care who they date, so long as they are happy. It would 
be wrong to discount the pressure Tibetans feel to court and marry other Tibetans in diaspora. 
Sara Conrad, in a paper presented at the Central States Anthropological Society Conference 
(2018), observed that there is a pressure, specifically among Tibetan women and solidified by the 
suggestion of the Dalai Lama, for Tibetans to practice endogamy and produce many children. 
Further, she noted that the CTA even provides incentives for Tibetan women to have many 
children, noting a form of biopolitical influence over women in diaspora (Foucault 1984). Lauer 
(2015) examined such debates and anxieties in her survey of second generation individuals in 
Switzerland, pointing to similar trends such as negotiating marrying outside the group and 
anxieties around language competency. Her conclusion was that “[the] study resulted in a 
completely heterogenous set of results that can only conclude with the caveat that a myriad of 
socialization processes must be taken into account when determining what is or is not Tibetan,” 
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(184). In other words, what is or is not Tibetan is individually negotiated and determined both in 
conjunction with the shared experience of peers and outside the boundaries of a monolithic 
culture complex. 
That being said, there are trends and overlapping experiences that can be identified, as noted 
above. What is of interest in this thesis is how these individuals use cyber-groups to reproduce, 
translate, share, and negotiate a communal sense of Tibetan identity in diaspora.  
Digital Narratives and Identity Online 
This examination of Tibetan contributions to cyberspace has demonstrated a number of 
things. Largely, as the title of the chapter would suggest, the theme underlying this writing deals 
with being Tibetan online. I do not argue that these two things are dichotomous. One is at once 
Tibetan and online and, as participants argued, cyberspace does not make one feel any more or 
less Tibetan; however, the digital tools and environments which have been examined do show 
novel ways in which Tibetan activism and identity are shaped, negotiated, and re-shaped.  
Homi Bhaba (2004) has argued that the location of culture can be determined through the 
texts we produce, which cannot be understood in a horizontal manner, but rather through the 
interpretation and reinterpretation of those text by a “tribe of interpreters” and translators (202). 
He also argues that the nation does not conform to boundaries of states, calling on the arguments 
of the imagined community by Anderson (1983) and Said’s (1978) analysis of the imagining of 
the “orient” by the West. This brings to mind the criticisms of Wimmer and Schiller (2002) of 
scholars who stick to methodological nationalism, or the insistence that nations may be 
understood in geographically bounded terms.  
An alternative in this digital age has been identified by Victoria Bernal in her work Nation as 
Network (2014), in which she argued that the nation is networked across numerous mediums of 
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interactions, including information technology. In the case of the Tibetan diaspora these texts, 
such a memes, biographies, and activist initiatives are disseminated and interpreted across 
distances through techno and mediascapes (Appadarai 1996) like Instagram and Twitter.  
Bhaba (2004) and Bernal (2014) both agree that narrative and texts of a nation are negotiated 
among stakeholders. The latter specifically argued that “the public sphere is self-reflexive, in that 
posts reflect on other posts and on the larger history and context of other posts,” (76). This 
provides insight into the digital community as being made of diverse individuals with 
backgrounds that identify with a common heritage (Tibetan) bonding over the shared experiences 
and negotiating their differences. There is not one answer or framework that can divine the 
essence of “being Tibetan (online)”; rather, there is a multitude of answers that highlight the 
diverse nature of the diaspora as a whole. 
With that, there is also to be found a more common framework that can help to generalize the 
patterns of the use of digital technology. Kyra Landzelius (2006) identified the inreach-outreach 
continuum to distinguish the ways in which indigenous and diasporic peoples tend to utilize 
internet technologies. In this framework, internet technologies may be used for either the purpose 
of tending to community and digitizing tradition and experience (in-reach) or the activism and 
advertising of related causes to gain allies outside their community (outreach). This chapter has 
examined both ends of the continuum and I argue that such a framework is very useful in the 
understanding and improving the use of digital technology at either end.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
I began this thesis research with the goal to discover the complicated ways in which new 
digital technologies and media have been adopted and subsequently brought change to Tibetans 
in diaspora and, specifically, the US. What I have attempted to demonstrate are the myriad ways 
in which digital information technology both limits and frees marginalized populations such as 
Tibetans. Whereas globalization and transnational governmentally have been made more 
ubiquitous and efficient than ever before, these technologies leave room for the agency and 
negotiation of identity within such communities.  
This thesis has grappled with two primary themes that formed my research questions. The 
first involved transnational hegemony of the state and to what extent transnational 
governmentally (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) affected citizens living outside of that state. More 
importantly, how is such a process affected by digital technology? Herein I have provided 
evidence to the point that transnational governmentality is made more efficient through mediums 
such as Twitter and Facebook. Specifically, this is so due to increased efficiency in surveillance 
and what Foucault (1977) referred to as “panopticism”, put simply as the willingness of the 
individual to become bearer of their own oppression through self-censorship and the surveillance 
of their peers. In effect, the state need not launch a large surveillance apparatus (though they do) 
because those considered within the nation do so themselves. We saw this process at work with 
Roy Jones, the Marriot Hotels employee who was fired for ‘liking’ a tweet (Ma 2018a) as well as 
with the testimony of my participants and through the comments found online. 
This “long arm” of the state is troubling and becomes doubly so when such an apparatus of 
power is allowed or aided in propagating itself through digital infrastructures and a global 
neoliberal economic model. As outlined in the Chapters 1 and 4, this has already been shown to 
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have tragic results. Couple this with global political and economic inequalities throughout the 
globalized world and one sees that only certain populations truly have access and authority 
online (Srinivasan 2017), which, as technology becomes more and more prevalent and 
ubiquitous for modern society, will further perpetuate inequality and oppression in said 
populations. With that being said, the evidence I have gathered would suggest that, despite the 
best efforts of some state actors, marginalized populations are not totally silenced in digital 
spaces. In fact, the opposite reveals itself to be true.  
The second theme of this thesis, and the primary purpose of my inquiry, was how Tibetan 
individuals in diaspora, primarily within the United States, but not excluding other English 
speaking populations, respond to the above. How do Tibetans adopt digital technologies in their 
daily lives and what part do they play in the maintenance of culture in diaspora? Do they show 
agency and resistance to the transnational hegemony of the Chinese state and if so how? This 
varies largely depending on the background of the person you ask. The philosophy, priorities, 
and engagement vary between individuals; however, larger themes are identifiable among the 
disparities.  
First, obviously Tibetan NGOs and activist groups maintain a presence online and 
demonstrate some agency and resistance through their promotions and initiatives. In this way, 
they exemplify the concept of the “freedom technologist” as an individual who uses new digital 
media as a tool for greater freedom in causes they feel passionate about. Beyond that realm of 
activism, Tibetans engage in cyberspace in a unique way. For many Tibetans, closed groups and 
group chats in messaging applications such as WeChat and Facebook allow for a space in which 
their cultural identity (being one that faces challenges in diaspora) can be negotiated, practiced, 
and replicated more reliably. Internet memes in particular, in keeping with their linguistic roots 
122 
 
(Dawkins 1976; Godwin 1993), are viral mimicries of the lived-in reality of Tibetans in diaspora. 
The sharing of memes serves as a sort of mirror in which other Tibetans may observe them and 
see their own reality reflected in that of those who post and react to them. They engage digitally 
in a form of cultural production and reproduction through these memes. Moreover, in the 
comments section, the culture of Tibetans in diaspora may be negotiated and certain cultural 
views or priorities may be challenged or rejected entirely.  
Therefore, in this concluding chapter, I would like to highlight some of the implications of 
my research. These will have to do largely with political implications, but will also touch on 
NGO involvement in and around the subject of Tibet as well as the ethics of technology design 
and research. 
The year 2018 was significant for being a year fraught with concern over the political 
implications of digital technology. Facebook was criticized heavily for its use of user data and 
the data brokerage market as a whole. Specifically, they received large amounts of backlash 
regarding their role (identified by the UN) in the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar and the data 
breach scandal of Cambridge Analytica. Both instances have inspired debates as to the danger 
posed by such unregulated technology which has so fundamentally changed how humans interact 
with and understand the world around them. Mark Zuckerberg was called to testify before the US 
Congress. Sundar Pichai, Google’s CEO, was also so called when controversy sprung up around 
the leaked “Project Dragonfly”.  
Specific anxieties have arisen regarding international interference and espionage. For 
example, controversies which have recently been the focus of attention include Russian 
interference in the 2016 American election and the American suspicion of Chinese tech company 
Huawei of being a spy apparatus of the Chinese state. These topics continue to be discussed and 
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debated as to their urgency and the implications of regulating or not regulating such 
technologies.  
Perhaps this thesis can be some start to providing evidence to the argument that such 
technologies provide power to state entities as they do agency to individual actors. It is also 
important in a discussion of geopolitics and technology to remember that not all of the world 
maintains the same access to technology (Srinivasan 2017). Development is uneven across the 
world and in a globalized world increasingly dependent on digital technologies for political and 
economic power, it will become equally important to consider such imbalance. In addition to 
this, human rights has and will become a large issue worthy of discussion. As examined in 
Chapter 4, China, as an infopolitcal state (Bernal 2014), has done much to limit both information 
coming into and leaving its borders via the internet—The Great Firewall of China. There have 
been efforts by journalists, activist groups, and NGOs to shed light on issues a state may wish 
concealed. Technology obscures as much as it enlightens in the globalized world. It should be 
the goal of researchers, developers, and activists to make technology more transparent, not less. 
Efforts already in motion towards this goal include the “Tibet Crisis Map” by the Tibetan Action 
Institute and various encrypted communication technologies such as WhatsApp.  
Neoliberalism thrives on obscurity whether that be the trade networks which prevent 
consumers from knowing the production process of their items like shoes or phones or what 
happens to their data when they agree to the terms and conditions of an application. Recently, a 
United States Senator and presidential hopeful argued that big-tech (companies like Facebook 
and Google) should be broken up, evidencing the mounting pressure being placed on the field of 
technology (Martínez 2019)72.  
                                              
72 https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-not-monopoly-but-should-broken-up/ 
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Future Research 
Future research and debate should be focused on how such large technology companies can 
be made more transparent or regulated in a way that protects the civil and human rights of users 
worldwide. Cybersecurity and transparent digital practices are also key discussion which need to 
be rigorously studied as our society becomes increasingly depending on information technology. 
Social scientists specifically would be of great use to this endeavor. Already anthropologists 
like Genevieve Bell (Dourish and Bell 2011) bring human research to IT companies like Intel. 
This trend of social scientists taking up positions in large tech companies should continue and be 
encouraged. Digitally inclined social scientists would also be of particular use employed in 
NGOs with goals of evening the technological development of the world, so long as they have 
been trained in the creation of that binary and constructed third-world dynamic (Escobar 1995). 
Those with training in social sciences are cognizant of the above issues would be better suited to 
hold positions of power in such institutions rather than someone who thinks nothing of such 
implications.  
From an academic perspective, further research should be pursued in two vital areas: 1) in the 
study of “freedom technologists” (Postill 2014) and the deployment of digital technologies in 
activism and community making and 2) in the design of these technologies to make for a more 
transparent and intuitive technological future. I also do not argue that this thesis has been 
exhaustive in understanding the geopolitical complexities and ramifications of diaspora, 
refugees, state surveillance, or Tibetans and technology specifically. Rather, I consider this an 
introduction to larger applied goals in which academics, researchers, developers, and activists 
work to improve access and freedom in the digital world.  
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Appendix A: Tibetan Terms 
 
Amala = means “mother”. 
Chuba = refers to a type of coat typically (but not always) worn by Tibetan women. It is usually 
made from a thick wool. 
Enji = means “outsider”. 
Khata = ceremonial scarf usually made from silk. It is used often in Tibetan Buddhism in 
blessing ceremonies. Specifically, the scarf is given to another (usually a monk) by 
placing it around their shoulders and is then returned to the first as a sign of blessing. 
Lhakar = means “white” or “pure”. 
Momo = Tibetan dumplings. 
Rangzen = “independence” or “freedom”. 
Stupa = A type of Buddhist shrine typically housing relics important to practitioners.  
Thangka = Traditional Tibetan art form usually depicting Buddhist deities, events, or history on 
a textile canvas. 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions 
Interview Questions: 
1. How many hours a week do you typically spend on digital media platforms? 
2. How many of those hours are related to Tibetan cultural practices or groups? 
3. What apps or sites do you use? 
4. Which of these do you use most often and why? 
5. How do these digital media technologies influence, in your view, Tibetan cultural 
expression and preservation. 
6. Do you feel more “Tibetan” when engaging with these cyber communities? 
7. As opposed to physical meetings? 
8. Do you feel that digital technologies are a help or hindrance to Tibetan cultural causes or 
preservation? 
9. How do you receive news related to Tibet? 
10. Do you engage in political discussion relating to Tibet online? 
11. Do you feel safe in online communities when discussing these topics? Why or why not? 
12. Do you have any experiences with censorship online, in any situation? 
13. How do you feel about Chinese influence in digital spaces? 
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Appendix C: IRB Documents 
Consent Document 
 
Study Title: The Long Arm of the State: Tibetan Diaspora and Transnational Hegemony 
 
Study Purpose and Rationale 
The purpose of this study is to better understand how individuals in the Tibetan community perceive 
outside influence and how digital technologies play a part in their daily cultural lives.  
 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Those considered for this study include members of the Tibetan cultural community, either directly or 
tangentially. Only individuals over the age of 18 will be considered for this study. Members of the 
community who do not speak English must be excluded from the study. 
 
Participation Procedures and Duration 
Your participation in this study includes sitting for an interview with a minimum duration of thirty minutes 
and answering the researcher’s questions based on your personal thoughts, feelings, and experiences. 
 
Audio or Video Tapes 
The researcher wishes to record interviews with participants only for the purpose of keeping track of 
responses. The audio recording will only ever be in the procession of the researcher and will not be used 
for any purpose outside of this study. 
 
Data Confidentiality or Anonymity 
All data will be maintained as confidential and no identifying information such as names will appear in any 
publication or presentation of the data. A translator should not be necessary, but if the English-speaking 
participant insists and provides one, confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.  
 
Storage of Data and Data Retention Period 
All data collected, including the audio recording, will be placed in either a secure cabinet in the 
researcher’s office or on a password protected external drive. All data gathered for this research will be 
destroyed after two years. 
 
Risks or Discomforts 
Some of the questions pertinent to this research will pertain to Chinese state policy and authority and 
therefore may be uncomfortable to discuss. Fear of any political consequences for the participant or 
community members is acknowledged and respected. 
 
Benefits 
There are no perceived benefits for participating in this study. 
 
Voluntary Participation  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw your permission at 
anytime for any reason without penalty or prejudice from the investigator.  Please feel free to ask any 
questions of the investigator before signing this form and at any time during the study. 
 
IRB Contact Information 
For one’s rights as a research subject, you may contact the following: For questions about your rights as 
a research subject, please contact the Director, Office of Research Integrity, Ball State University, 
Muncie, IN 47306, (765) 285-5070 or at irb@bsu.edu. 
 
 
 
Study Title   The Long Arm of the State: Tibetan Diaspora and Transnational Hegemony 
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********** 
 
Consent 
I, ___________________, agree to participate in this research project entitled, The Long Arm of the 
State: Tibetan Diaspora and Transnational Hegemony I have had the study explained to me and my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I have read the description of this project and give my 
consent to participate.  I understand that I will receive a copy of this informed consent form to keep for 
future reference. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, I meet the inclusion/exclusion criteria for participation (described on the 
previous page) in this study. 
 
 
 
________________________________   _________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Contact Information 
 
Principal Investigator:     Faculty Supervisor: 
 
Jordan C. Keck, Graduate Student   Dr. Robert F. Phillips 
Department of Anthropology     Department of Anthropology 
Ball State University     Ball State University 
Muncie, IN  47306     Muncie, IN  47306 
Telephone: (765) 617-6092    Telephone:  (765) 285-7512 
Email:  jkeck@bsu.edu     Email:  rfphillips@bsu.edu 
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